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I. INTRODUCTION
INTEREST and damages can look alike.' Both are paid by one party to
compensate another and both can be measured by the time value of
money. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Code2 treats interest and
damages in very different ways? While much interest is deductible, the
deductibility of damages depends on the origin of the claim to which the
damages relate. The classification of an amount as either interest or
damages can therefore determine its deductibility.
4
Notwithstanding the importance of distinguishing between interest
and damages, courts,' commentators6 and legislators7 may have mis-
1. In his 1977 article on the interest deduction Professor Michael Asimow noted the potential
similarity between interest and damages, and collected some of the cases in which courts grappled
with the distinction. Michael Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. REv. 749, 770-72
(1979). The Supreme Court has also considered the similarity between interest and damages. Kiesel-
bach v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399 (1943); Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927); Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States,
265 U.S. 106 (1924); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). See infra notes
20-53 and accompanying text.
2. Unless otherwise stated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. This difference in treatment has led the courts to grapple with the question of whether partic-
ular amounts are interest or something else, including damages. See, eg., Commissioner v. Raphael,
133 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 745 (1943); N.V. Koninljke Hollandische Lloyd v.
Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 830 (1936); Consorzio Veneziano di Armamento e Navigazione v. Com-
missioner, 21 B.T.A. 984 (1930), nonacq., 10-1 C.B. 77 (1931); and the text accompanying notes 38-
42, infra. -See also Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990); West v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1694 (1991), discussed in Part II.B., infra.
4. The characterization of an amount as either interest or damages can also determine the extent
to which it is included in income when received and the rate at which it is taxed. Whereas interest is
ordinary income in full, the taxation of damages depends on the nature of the item for which they
substitute. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 30 (1941); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 459, 461-62 (1972); cf Rev. Proc. 67-33, 1967-2 C.B. 659 (like the taxation of damages, the
taxation of settlements depends on the taxation of the amounts for which the settlement substitutes).
Damages for lost property are treated by reference to the property and are therefore included in
income only to the extent that they exceed the taxpayer's basis. See Gilbertz v. United States, 808
F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1987); Keller St. Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1982). By
contrast, damages for lost wages are treated like the wages themselves and are ordinary income in
full, unless they compensate the taxpayer for personal injury. See infra note 162. Compensatory
damages on account of personal injury or sickness are excluded from the taxpayer's income in their
entirety as provided by I.R.C. § 104(a). Punitive damages received on account of nonphysical per-
sonal injury are now included in the taxpayers income. I.R.C. § 104(a). The status of punitive
damages received on account of personal injury is subject to debate. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes
and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 143 (1992); Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Act Compounds Confusion
Over Tax Status of Personal Injury Damages, 49 TAX NoTEs 1565 (1990). See also infra notes 162-
70.
5. See, eg., Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399 (1943); Filipini v. United States, 318
F.2d 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Johnson & Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 851
(2d Cir. 1945); 320 East 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd on other grounds,
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characterized certain types of damages by calling them interest. In its
zeal to identify and tax any amounts which compensate for the time
value of money,8 Congress may have gone too far. It may have swept
243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); Tiefenbrunn v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1566 (1980); Seltzer v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1082 (1987); Walter v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1051 (1971); A.S.
Norby v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077 (1961); Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 1
T.C.M. (CCH) 527 (1943).
6. For example, in The Interest Deduction, Professor Asimow discusses In re Bettendorf, 3
B.T.A. 378 (1926), where the court denied a deduction for an amount which it found to be nonde-
ductible damages rather than deductible interest, as well as other cases in which courts faced the
issue of the characterization of a particular amount as interest. Professor Asimov concluded that
"the Bettendorf line of authority now seems discredited." Asimow, supra note 1, at 771. Professor
Asimow noted that Jordan v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 872 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1209
(8th Cir. 1975), where the court found that a taxpayer who was forced to rescind a public offering of
stock by offering to pay the original price of the stock plus five percent interest from the date of
purchase could not deduct the five percent as interest, did not represent a revival of the Bettendorf
theory but resulted from a failure of proof on the part of the taxpayer. He concluded that:
Although not forthrightly disapproved, the Bettendorf line of cases seems erroneous. In
each case, the plaintiff suffered from a particular wrong on a particular date. If the
plaintiff had sued immediately, he would have recovered compensation for that loss.
Since suit was brought later, the court awarded an additional sum as compensation for
the additional loss resulting from that delay, during which time the defendant had the
plaintiff's money. This compensation is interest, whether the test utilized is that of the
common man or the economist.
Asimow, supra note 1, at 772 (footnote omitted). Professor Asimow does not explain why the com-
pensation is interest. See id at 770-72. As this Article will demonstrate, the conclusion that the
compensatory amount must be interest does not follow as clearly as Professor Asimow believes.
That compensation is measured by an annual percentage rate does not make it interest. The need to
establish the existence of indebtedness, which the court found important in Jordan, but which Pro.
fessor Asimow is willing to minimize (see iL at 771), should be essential to a finding of interest.
7. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 467 (requiring the accrual of interest on certain rental agreements); I.R.C.
§ 483 (requiring that certain amounts paid in connection with the sale or exchange of property be
treated as interest); I.R.C. § 1272 (requiring the current inclusion in income of original issue dis-
count); I.R.C. § 7872 (imputing interest in certain transactions which provide for inadequate stated
interest). See Daniel J. Halperin, Interest in Disguise" Taxing the "Time Value of Money" 95 YALE
L.J. 506 (1986). In his dissent from the tax court's decision in Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95
T.C. 415 (1990), which held that certain amounts accrued by an employer on deferred compensation
arrangements were not interest for tax purposes, Judge Fay observed: "In recent years Congress has
been attempting to identify hidden interest. See §§ 163, 467, 483, 1272, and 7872. To deny an
interest element in this transaction would be to stand history on its head." 95 T.C. 415, 433 n.4
(1990) (Fay, J., dissenting). See infra note 105. It is precisely such reluctance to conclude that
amounts are not interest that has led to the present confusion in the law.
The desire to ensure that all measurable items of economic benefit become a part of the tax base
does not require a divorce between the characterization of an amount as interest and the rationale
behind the interest deduction. In many cases, it will follow from the identification of an economic
benefit that the benefit will be taxed. Whether the benefit is labeled interest or something else is often
nearly irrelevant. Only in rare cases would a newly identified economic benefit be taxed as some-
thing other than ordinary income. But cf Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990) (an amount
found to constitute interest was held to be separate from the personal injury judgment in connection
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into the definition of the term "interest" amounts which should not be
treated as interest at all.
This Article questions the current state of the law and proposes an
alternative analysis. It suggests that some amounts which the law has
traditionally called interest may more accurately be characterized as
damages. The Article attempts to provoke further discussion by urging
that the distinction between interest and damages be clearly identified
and made a prominent part of the legal landscape. Doing so could pro-
vide courts and legislators with a valuable analytical tool, and bring ac-
curacy both to the federal income tax treatment of these amounts and to
the way in which they are perceived under the law as a whole.9
The Article uses the controversy over the deductibility of corporate
deficiency interest to provide a focus for the broader discussion. The
with which it was awarded, and therefore not subject to the exclusion provided by § 104 and taxable
as ordinary income). Making the term interest synonymous with 'economic benefit which the tax
system should take into account' on the income side has fewer deleterious consequences than doing
so on the deduction side. while making that distinction may lead to a lack of symmetry, symmetry,
like consistency, is not always desirable. Classification, like form, should follow function.
9. The similarity between interest and damages, and the reason to distinguish between them, has
been noted in other areas of the law. Thus, the distinction is sometimes relevant to the resolution of
choice of law questions. See Polglase v. Greyhound Lines, 401 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1975) (choice
of law depended on the determination of whether prejudgment interest was interest or damages
because if it was interest it was procedural and the law of one jurisdiction would apply, but if it was
damages it was substantive and the law of a different jurisdiction would apply; the court concluded
that prejudgment interest was in the nature of damages and was therefore a substantive matter). See
also Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988
(1956).
Determining whether interest on a judgment is properly viewed as part of the judgment itself or
as a separate element necessary to make a plaintiff whole is also important in determining whether
any amounts should be added to a judgment to compensate a plaintiff for the delay in being awarded
the judgment and, if so, how the additional amounts should be measured. See Love v. New York,
583 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1991), which provides a recent illustration. In Love, the court reasoned that
in a bifurcated personal injury trial, interest runs from the date on which the defendant's liability is
established, even though the amount of damages is not yet fixed. The court held that prejudgment
interest is intended "to indemnify [successful] plaintiffs for the nonpayment of what is due them."
Id. (quoting Trimboli v. Scarpaci Funeral Home, 37 A.D.2d 386, 389 (1971), aff'd, 283 N.E.2d 614
(N.Y. 1972)). Indeed, in describing the court's holding in Love, one commentator employed an
analysis which appears to foreshadow that advocated here. See In Bifurcated Personal Injury Trial,
Court of Appeals Holds Interest on Damages Runs From Earlier Verdict of Liability, N.Y. ST. L.
DIG., Dec. 1991, at 1.
In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 547-49 (1983), the Supreme Court
struggled with the question of how to take the time value of money into account in determining the
total amount of a damage award, and tried to identify the factors that courts should take into ac-
count in establishing the appropriate discount rate. Although other courts and legislatures have
doubtless faced the same struggle, further exploration of the role of amounts commonly labeled
prejudgment interest in the law of remedies is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra notes 13
and 120.
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Code has long provided that taxpayers who underpay their taxes must
pay the amount of the deficiency plus an additional amount which is
measured by a percentage rate.'" The Code has characterized this addi-
tional amount as interest ("deficiency interest")" and has treated it as
interest for tax purposes.' 2 But the characterization of deficiency inter-
est as interest may be wrong; deficiency interest might more accurately
be characterized as damages. Indeed, the Code may have confused the
measure of damages, an interest rate, with the amount itself. 3 Although
deficiency interest compensates the government for the harm caused by
10. I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6621.
11. The term "deficiency interest" will be used herein to refer to interest paid or incurred on
federal tax deficiencies, as provided by I.R.C. § 6601.
12. Section 6601 assumes that what it calls interest will be so treated for tax purposes. Both the
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service have accepted the characterization of defi-
ciency interest as interest. Thus, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i) (1987) provides that income
tax deficiency interest is personal interest, and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(iii)(C) (1987)
specifically excludes from the definition of personal interest deficiency interest on certain
nonindividual income tax deficiencies; if deficiency interest were not interest under the Code, it
would not need to be specifically excluded from the definition of personal interest in the temporary
regulations. See Rev. Proc. 60-17, 1960-2 C.B. 942; I.R.C. § 6601(e); Treas. Reg. § 301.6601-1(f) (as
amended in 1983) (providing that interest imposed by § 6601 will be assessed and collected in the
same manner as the tax).
13. The use of the term interest to refer to an amount due as a result of the passage of time is
widespread. It occurs in the case of amounts added to damage awards to compensate the wronged
party for the delay in the payment of damages, commonly referred to as prejudgment interest. See,
eg., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923); Union Bank v. First Nat'l Bank,
677 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1982); Hussey Metals Div. of Copper Range Co. v. Lectromelt Furnace
Div., McGraw Edison Co., 417 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977);
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, 195-98 (1985); Michael J. Martin, Note,
Prejudgment Interest: Implementing Its Compensatory Purpose, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 541 (1983);
Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L.
REv. 192 (1982). Indeed, persistence in treating these amounts as something in addition to and
separate from the damages which compensate for the injury in question has led to much dispute
about the circumstances under which they are allowed. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 272
(Alaska 1970) (prejudgment interest is part of damages paid to make the damaged party whole and is
appropriate for all damages whether liquidated or unliquidated, pecuniary or nonpecuniary); Union
Bank, 677 F.2d 1074, 1077 (prejudgment interest should be viewed as compensation for damages).
See generally CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 54-56 (1935).
The confusion also occurs in the case of trade credit, where payment after the passage of some
stated amount of time requires the payment of the stated amount plus an additional amount labeled
interest. See, eg., ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. ScoTr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS. PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 548-53 (2d ed. 1991). It is also evident in the frequent requirement for the
payment of an increased amount of interest upon late payment of the principal and interest due on a
conventional loan. See West v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1694 (1991). It is possible that
none of these amounts are true interest but rather are delay damages. While an exploration of the
ramifications of a recharacterization of interest as damages in all of these areas is beyond the scope of
this Article, perhaps the analysis contained herein will prove useful to others undertaking such an
exploration.
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the delay in payment and is measured by a percentage rate, I suggest that
it not be treated as interest at all. Treating deficiency interest as interest
for tax purposes does not further the policies that justify the existence of
the interest deduction.
14
The characterization of an amount as interest should follow from
the reason for the interest deduction. As this Article will suggest,
amounts should be treated as interest for tax purposes only when they are
paid to compensate for the consensual lending of money. To treat as
interest amounts which do not arise from consensual lending transac-
tions is arguably inconsistent with the rationale for the interest deduction
and therefore fails to effectuate sound tax policy.
A prominent and clearly articulated distinction is obviously needed:
in at least two recent cases the tax court struggled to determine whether
particular amounts should be treated as interest or as something else. 15
In addition to leading to a more appropriate characterization of amounts
which the Code has called interest, the analysis proposed here might
have made it easier for the tax court to distinguish interest from other
amounts and thus to reach the correct result.
Part II of this Article reviews the case law and demonstrates that
courts once understood and articulated the distinction between interest
and damages. It develops a hypothesis to explain the demise of the dis-
tinction and shows how sound tax policy would be served by its reinstate-
ment. Part III explains the recent controversy over the tax treatment of
corporate deficiency interest and discusses the effects of adopting the sug-
gested analysis.
Part IV analyzes a disparity in treatment of corporate taxpayers that
could result from the application of the proposed analysis to deficiency
interest. Because adoption of the suggested analysis would lead to a
reclassification of deficiency interest as damages, deficiency interest
would not be deductible as interest. Deficiency interest would probably
not be deductible as damages, either. 6 If current law remains otherwise
unchanged and corporate interest expense remains generally deducti-
ble,17 corporations that pay the tax late, with deficiency interest, would
14. See infra text accompanying notes 115-23.
15. Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990); West v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH)
1694 (1991). See infra text accompanying notes 54-72.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 162-70.
17. Although Congress has, in recent years, enacted provisions which tie the deductibility of
some corporate interest expense to the use of the borrowed funds, these provisions have been
designed to curb perceived abuses and do not apply to corporate interest expense generally. See infra
note 79. See also infra notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
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be denied a deduction while those that borrow and incur an interest ex-
pense to pay the tax would be allowed a deduction for the interest ex-
pense incurred. Although a system that distinguishes between deficiency
interest and interest on a third party loan used to pay a deficiency would
not necessarily be unsound,18 the potential for disparate treatment of tax-
payers in similar economic positions suggests that the deductibility of
corporate interest expense should be re-examined. 19 Part V therefore
suggests a rationale and outlines a model for making the deductibility of
corporate interest expense dependent upon the use of the loan proceeds.
II. THE CONFUSION BETWEEN INTEREST AND DAMAGES
A. Where We Went Wrong: An Historical Perspective
The law has not always treated all compensatory amounts measured
by a percentage rate as interest, although the similarities between interest
and damages were noted long ago in cases involving requests for prejudg-
ment interest. In Redfield v. Ystalfera Iron Co.,2 a case decided in 1884,
the Supreme Court observed that "interest is given on money demands as
damages for delay in payment, being just compensation to the plaintiff
for a default on the part of his debtor."21 In Redfield the plaintiff had
obtained a judgment in 1856, but had waited nearly 30 years to bring a
collection action. In the collection action, the plaintiff sought payment
of the original amount awarded plus interest for the 30 year period. The
court denied the award of interest on the theory that the interest was
being sought as damages - since the plaintiff was "guilty of laches in
unreasonably delaying the prosecution of his claim, [the interest] may be
properly withheld."22 The Redfield Court recognized that what the
plaintiff was calling interest was really damages, and was subject to the
equitable doctrines applicable to the collection of damages.
1. The Condemnation Cases. A series of cases involving the con-
demnation of property by the federal government provided another op-
18. The nature of the taxpayer's relationship to the government with respect to deficiency inter-
est differs significantly from the nature of a taxpayer's relationship to a third party lender, and this
distinction justifies different treatment of the charges. See infra Part IV.
19. The question of whether there are policy considerations that suggest that deficiency interest
should be deductible even if it is not deductible as interest deserves thorough exploration. Such
thorough exploration is beyond the scope of this Article, which uses deficiency interest only as a
focus for discussing the broader subject of the distinction between interest and damages.
20. 110 U.S. 174(1884).
21. Id. at 176.
22. Id.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
portunity for the lower federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
to explore the relationship between interest and damages.23 A review of
these cases helps to explain why the distinction that appeared so evident
to the Redfield Court in 1884 seems to have disappeared from the legal
landscape.24
Almost 30 years after Redfield, the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the federal government must compensate the owner of con-
demned land for the period between the government's taking of the land
and the date on which the value of the land was judicially determined. 25
In United States v. Rogers, a property owner argued that compensation
for that period was necessarily part of the just compensation which the
Constitution guaranteed him. The government defended on the ground
that a federal statute prohibited the government's payment of interest.
The Court found that "it was the duty of the Government to make just
compensation as of the time when the owners were deprived of their
property, '26 and ordered the government to pay the owner an amount
measured by a state statute that provided for the payment of interest.
The Court's use of a statutory interest rate to measure the compensation
due the owner began to blur the distinction between interest and
damages.
Two years later, in Seaboard Air Line Railway v. United States,27 the
Supreme Court extended the Rogers analysis to all condemnation cases.
In Seaboard Air Line the Court reasoned that,
The rule above referred to, that in the absence of agreement to pay or stat-
ute allowing it the United States will not be held liable for interest on un-
paid accounts and claims, does not apply here. The requirement that "just
compensation" shall be paid is comprehensive and includes all elements and
no specific command to include interest is necessary when interest or its
equivalent is a part of such compensation. Where the United States con-
demns and takes possession of land before ascertaining or paying compen-
sation, the owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of
the taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent
of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking. Interest at a proper
rate is a good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.28
In Seaboard Air Line the Supreme Court saw clearly that under certain
circumstances amounts commonly labeled interest were really only a
23. See infra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
24. One notable exception remains. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
25. United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163 (1921).
26. Id. at 169.
27. 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
28. Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 40
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measure of damages.29
The owners of the condemned property at issue in the foregoing
cases probably did not care whether the amounts in question were inter-
est or damages, as long as they got the money. But the growth of the
income tax changed that.30  A system that distinguishes between capital
gains and ordinary income and provides special nonrecognition provi-
sions for proceeds of condemnation makes it necessary to distinguish be-
tween the condemnation award and any additions thereto.3" Courts soon
had to decide whether the additional compensatory amount was to be
treated as interest or as part of the compensatory award for federal in-
come tax purposes.3 2 Predictably, the Service generally favored charac-
terization of the amounts as interest because that yielded immediate
recognition at ordinary income rates. Just as predictably, taxpayers gen-
erally favored characterization as part of the compensatory award be-
cause that yielded either nonrecognition or recognition of gain at capital
gains rates.
The lower courts generally agreed with the taxpayers, 3 but in 1941
the Supreme Court found in favor of the Service. In Kieselbach v. Com-
29. The Court followed Seaboard Air Line in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S.
106 (1924); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 215 (1927); and Phelps v.
United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927).
30. This is not to suggest that income taxes were irrelevant at the time those cases were decided.
It is only to suggest that the growth of both the individual and corporate income tax systems and the
increase in rates brought about by the need to finance World War I probably made tax consequences
more salient than they had previously been.
31. See I.R.C. § 1033 (permitting nonrecognition of gain realized upon the involuntary conver-
sion, including "seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof"); I.R.C.
§ 123 1(a) (providing preferential treatment for gain recognized on certain types of involuntarily con-
verted property).
32. The need to determine whether these amounts were interest for tax purposes also arose
because of the need to determine whether the amounts were exempted from taxation altogether when
they were paid by a state rather than by the federal government. If the amounts were interest, the
predecessor of § 103 would provide an exclusion. The courts uniformly held that the amounts were
not interest within the meaning of the predecessor of§ 103 because they were not paid in the exercise
of the states' borrowing power. See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
33. See, ag., Commissioner v. Appleby's Estate, 123 F.2d 700, 701 (2d Cir. 1941) (increment to
award for condemnation treated as a capital gain rather than ordinary income, although denomi-
nated as "interest"); Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 990, 994 (2d Cir.) (addi-
tional sums paid to indemnify for delay not considered interest but part of compensation awarded for
property taken), cert denied, 328 U.S. 618 (1939); Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 47
B.T.A. 866, 892-93 (1943) (interest given in addition to award for condemnation taxed as part of
award), acq., 1943 C.B. 18, modified, I T.C.M. (CCH) 527 (1943); Brown v. Commissioner, 47
B.T.A. 139, 142 (1942) (interest added to condemnation award treated as capital gain, not as ordi-
nary income), acq., 1943 C.B. 3.
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missioner,34 the Court held that the additional amounts were not part of
the sale price of the condemned property.3" That made them ordinary
income, currently recognizable, regardless of whether they were inter-
est.36 The Court did not decide that the amounts were interest.37 By
avoiding a precise characterization, the Court set the stage for the cur-
rent confusion in the law.
2. The Nonresident Alien Cases. Prior to the Court's decision in
Kieselbach, the Board of Tax Appeals had been faced with the question
of whether amounts awarded in addition to damages were interest or part
of the damage award.38 The issue often arose in the context of nonresi-
dent aliens not engaged in the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States because such individuals are subject to United States tax
only on certain types of income derived from sources within the United
States.39 In a series of cases that ended in 1943, 0 the Board held that
amounts paid in addition to stated damages to compensate for the delay
in payment were not interest and were not subject to U.S. tax.
In support of its conclusion in those cases, the Board cited the
Supreme Court's opinion in Seaboard Air Line." Like the Court in Sea-
34. 317 U.S. 399 (1943).
35. Id. at 404.
36. Kieselbach can be seen as a revenue maximizing decision. Because condemnation awards
are, by definition, paid by a governmental entity not subject to federal income taxes, a decision that
the amounts are interest is irrelevant from the standpoint of deductibility to the payor, but assures
maximum taxation of the payee.
37. 317 U.S. at 403.
38. See In re Bettendorf, 3 B.T.A. 378 (1926); Consorzio Veneziano di Armamento e Naviga-
zione v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 984 (1930), nonacq., 10-1 C.B. 77 (1931); N.V. Koninklelijke
Hollandische Lloyd v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 830 (1936); Lang v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 256
(1941), rev'd sub norn. Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.), and cert. denied, 320 U.S.
735 (1943). See also Asimow, supra note 1, at 770-72.
39. Section 871 so provides currently, as did its predecessor, I.R.C. § 211(a)(1)(A) (1939).
40. See cases cited in note 38, supra. InIn re Bettendorf, 3 B.T.A. 378 (1926), the issue arose in
a different way. In that case, a taxpayer deducted amounts he was ordered to pay a plaintiff in a
lawsuit. The Service challenged the characterization of those amounts as interest on the theory that
they really represented damages on account of the conversion, and were therefore not deductible.
The Board agreed with the Service, finding that because "the relation of debtor and creditor did not
exist between the taxpayer and [the plaintiff] ... the interest included in the decree of the court...
was not interest on indebtedness. -. and hence is not deductible in computing the taxpayer's net
income for the years in which it was paid." 3 B.T.A. at 384. Significantly, the Board distinguished
post-judgment interest, and held that once the judgment was rendered, a debtor creditor relationship
existed and the amount paid by the taxpayer for that period was interest for tax purposes and de-
ductible as such. 3 B.T.A. at 384-85.
41. See, ag., Lang, 45 B.T.A. at 263; Consorzio, 21 B.T.A. at 989; Koninklelke, 34 B.T.A. at
834.
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board Air Line, the Board felt that although the additional amounts were
compensatory, they were not interest. In 1943, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The Ninth Circuit, in Commissioner v. Raphael,42 interpreted the
Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Kieselbach as holding that such
additional amounts are interest and should be treated as such for tax
purposes. This characterization was unfortunate. A fair reading of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests that the court meant to say that the
additional amounts compensated the taxpayer for its inability to earn in-
terest, and were therefore a substitute for interest which should be taxed
like interest. Had the court stated this analysis explicitly, the distinction
between true interest and amounts which compensate for the damage
caused by the inability to earn it might have remained clear. As it was,
by holding that the amounts were interest (not merely substitutes there-
for), the Ninth Circuit clouded future analysis.
3. The Overpayment Case. The Ninth Circuit drew support for
its conclusion from Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank.43 In
Stockholms Enskilda the Supreme Court held that amounts labeled inter-
est and paid by the United States on a refund of U.S. income taxes to a
nonresident alien were interest within the meaning of the predecessor of
section 871 and were thus taxable to the nonresident alien.' Reliance on
Stockholms Enskilda for the proposition that what the Code labels inter-
est should be treated as such for tax purposes is misplaced for two rea-
sons. First, it assumes that overpayments and underpayments deserve
equivalent treatment.45 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
Court's analysis in Stockholms Enskilda actually supports the characteri-
zation of deficiency interest as damages. The Ninth Circuit saw neither
of those elements, and thus created the confusion that remains in the law
42. Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442, 446 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 735 (1943).
43. 293 U.S. 84 (1935); Raphael, 133 F.2d at 445.
44. Id.
45. The Service has stated that:
Under the general rule, interest is paid on a tax overpayment for the time the govern-
ment has the use of the taxpayer's money. Interest is collected, similarly, for the time
the taxpayer has the use of the government's money. The underlying objective is to
determine in a given situation whose money it is and for how long the other party had
the use of it.
Rev. Proc. 60-17, 1960-2 C.B. 942.
That the Service treats interest in this way, and correctly describes this as the general rule does
not mean that the rule is correct. While viewing the taxpayer as a lender in the overpayment situa-
tion might be correct, that neither compels nor justifies a view of the government as lender in the
underpayment situation. See infra note 47.
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Arguably, the issue of the characterization of deficiency interest is
not resolved by Stockholms Enskilda because that case involved interest
on an overpayment. Although it is tempting to treat overpayments and
underpayments as different sides of the same coin, such treatment is not
necessarily correct. Overpayments and underpayments proceed from
fundamentally different transactions and could reasonably be treated in
different ways. 7 Most simplistically, in the overpayment case there is an
actual transfer of money. In the underpayment case there is no such
transfer - there is nothing more than a dispute about the existence of a
debt.4 8 It is much easier to say there is interest when there is a transfer of
funds than where there is not.
46. For example, CCH Standard Federal Tax Reports notes that the tax court in Consorzio
Veneziano di Armamento e Navigazione v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 984 (1930), nonaeq., 10-1 C.B.
77 (1931), held that "interest included by the Court of Claims in a judgment against the U.S. for
compensation for the taking of property for public use during the war is not taxable to a foreign
corporation." Judgment against the US., [1991] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 26,965.106 (1990).
However, CCH restricts the current applicability of the holding by noting that the decision was
rendered before the Supreme Court decision in Stockholms Enskilda. Interest on Income Tax Re-
fund, [1991] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 26,965.097 (1990).
Careful analysis of Stockholms Enskilda does not require the demise of Consorzio. Consorzio
involved an amount payable by the U.S. purely as compensation. There was no loan. By contrast,
Stockholms Enskilda, like all overpayment cases, arguably involves a loan and therefore an amount
properly characterized as interest. Thus viewed, Stockholms Enskilda is correctly decided, and Con-
sorzio and cases like it remain good law.
47. In the case of an overpayment, the taxpayer has remitted her own money to the government
in compliance with the requirements imposed by the Code. When the money is refunded, the tax-
payer is receiving a return of her money, much like a lender does upon repayment of a loan. The
economic substance of the transaction more closely resembles a true lending transaction. In the
underpayment situation the taxpayer has remitted no funds. She has merely failed to comply with
her duty to pay the amount of taxes due. The failure to comply with a legal duty constitutes a wrong
which has harmed the government.
The overpayment situation is also consensual. The taxpayer voluntarily remits the amount she
believes is due and the government agrees to refund it in the event of error. I.R.C. § 6402. The
overpayment situation is therefore more like a true lending transaction even though the interest rate
does not vary among taxpayers. See, eg, I.R.C. § 6611 (providing for the payment of interest on
overpayment); I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1) (establishing the rate at one percentage point less than the un-
derpayment rate). As in a commercial transaction, it is the government's creditworthiness that de-
termines the rate of interest. Because the government is in the position of the borrower with respect
to all overpayment cases, the existence of a set rate of interest does not detract from the characteriza-
tion of the amount as interest. The amount need not vary from taxpayer to taxpayer because the
putative borrower is always the same. By contrast, in the case of an underpayment, the identity of
the putative borrower would vary in each case. True interest would also vary. But see Marvin J.
Garbis & Miriam L. Fisher, The Tilted Table" Penalties and Interest on Federal Tax Deficiencies, 7
VA. TAx REv. 485 (1988) (taking the position that the difference between the overpayment and
underpayment rates is unfair and ill-conceived).
48. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Stockholms Enskilda was misguided
for another reason. The Ninth Circuit blindly applied the Court's hold-
ing but ignored its reasoning. In Stockholms Enskilda the Court used tax
policy to provide an analysis remarkably like that advocated here. The
Court looked at the purpose of the statute in question to determine
whether the amounts which the Code labeled interest on an overpayment
should be treated as interest for purposes of subjecting a nonresident
alien to United States taxation.49 Because the statutory purpose was to
subject all income from U.S. sources to income taxation, and not to aid
the government's borrowing by making interest on its obligations tax ex-
empt, the Court construed the term "obligation" to include the govern-
ment's statutorily created obligation to pay interest on overpayments.50
The Court declined to construe the term obligation to cover only
amounts paid under the exercise of the government's borrowing power
because such a narrow construction would fail to effectuate the policy
behind the statutory provision."1 Thus, reading Stockholms Enskilda as
requiring that what the statute labels interest be treated as such for all
tax purposes in all cases ignores the essence of the Court's analysis.
Taxation of interest, like all taxation, ought to be grounded in policy
considerations.52 The cases decided by the Board of Tax Appeals before
Kieselbach effected sound tax policy because they treated as interest only
amounts which were the product of a lending transaction. Unlike non-
resident aliens who loan money to a U.S. person or even nonresident
aliens who overpay their federal income taxes, the nonresident aliens in-
volved in the pre-Raphael cases decided by the Board of Tax Appeals did
not intend or expect to derive interest income from sources within the
U.S. They intended only to enter into the activities which resulted in the
lawsuits in question, and it is good tax policy to treat the proceeds of
those activities in accordance with that intent. If the proceeds of a sale
for full and fair consideration would not have been subject to tax, sound
49. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 86-90 (1935).
50. Id. at 89.
51. In American Viscose Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
615 (1932), the court held that interest on an overpayment of federal income taxes was not covered
by a provision that exempted interest on "obligations of the United States" from federal income
taxes. Like the courts which addressed the payment of delay damages in the state condemnation
cases (discussed infra at note 110 and accompanying text), the court in American Viscose noted that
the amounts in question were not paid under the exercise of the government's borrowing power, and
therefore no purpose would be served by including them within the exclusionary provision. 56 F.2d
at 1034.
52. See generally Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Rev. Rul. 76-413, 1976-2 C.B.
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tax policy requires that amounts awarded to compensate for delay in re-
ceiving such proceeds not be subject to U.S. tax either.
5 3
B. The Way Back
The need to distinguish between interest and damages did not end
with the decisions in Kieselbach and Stockholms Enskilda. Recent cases
illustrate the need to return to a clearly articulated distinction between
interest and damages. For example, in West v. Commissioner,54 the tax-
payers took the position that an additional amount due upon the late
payment of a home mortgage was deductible interest. 55 The taxpayers
argued that the amount due upon late payment was interest because the
mortgage note gave them the option of either paying on a given date at
one rate or paying at a later date at a higher rate. The Service took the
position that the amounts were not interest, but found the position diffi-
cult to sustain because in Revenue Ruling 74-18756 it had held that a late
payment charge assessed by a public utility was interest.
In Revenue Ruling 74-187, the Service had attempted to distinguish
interest from service charges. Since there was no evidence that the late
payment charge bore a relationship to the costs of a specific service per-
formed by the utility in connection with the delinquent customer's ac-
count, the Service concluded that the charge must be for the use or
forbearance of money and was therefore interest.57 In West, the Service
attempted to distinguish Revenue Ruling 74-187 by urging that the late
payment charge levied by the bank in that case "compensate[d] the bank
for costs resulting from delinquent real estate loans."5" The tax court
53. The courts continue to so hold with respect to payments made by states in condemnation
cases. Both the Service and the courts agree that amounts so awarded by a state are not interest
exempt from federal income tax pursuant to § 103. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
54. 61 T.C.M. (CCI-) 1694 (1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-70217 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1991).
55. Id.
56. 1974-1 C.B. 48.
57. The Service reached similar conclusions in Rev. Rul. 79-349, 1979-2 C.B. 233 (service fees
on mortgage loans); Rev. Rul. 77-417, 1977-2 C.B. 60 (one time charges on credit card accounts);
Rev. Rul. 74-395, 1974-2 C.B. 46 (commitment fee); Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974 C.B. 149 (points on a
construction loan); Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49 (finance charges on a revolving charge ac-
count); Rev. Rul. 71-98, 1971-1 C.B. 57, modified by Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49 (finance
charges on a revolving charge account); Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29, amplifying Rev. Rul. 69-
188, 1969-1 C.B. 54 (loan processing fees). See also Rev. Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 19 (amounts
charged in connection with a tuition postponement plan charged by a university); Kena, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941). In Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-3 I.R.B. 27, the Service announced
a five-part test for establishing the deductibility of points paid in connection with the acquisition of a
principal residence.
58. West v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1694 (1991).
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was unpersuaded by this distinction, and noted that the late payment
charge was intended to: (1) compensate the bank for expenses it incurred
as a result of the borrower's breach, (2) penalize the borrower for tardi-
ness, and (3) compensate the bank for lost earnings. Nevertheless, it
found for the Service, holding that the late payment charge should not be
treated as interest.5 9
The West court reached the correct conclusion - the problem is
that it was so hard for it to get there. The court seemed troubled because
the late payment charge included elements of compensation, deterrence,
and replacement of foregone earnings and it was difficult for the court to
make any one of these characteristics determinative.' Had the court
considered the possibility that the amounts in question were damages, its
task would have been considerably easier.61 Damages have all of the
characteristics the court identified. Damages compensate both for the
costs of breach and for the gain forgone as a result thereof, and the abil-
ity to award them induces compliance (or deters breach).62 The late pay-
59. Id at 1696-97. The court ultimately ignored the ruling and justified doing so by noting that
"a revenue ruling merely represents the Commissioner's position with respect to a particular factual
situation; we are not bound to follow its conclusion, for it does not constitute substantive authority
in this Court." Id (citation omitted).
60. In particular, the existence of the element of deterrence in many of these situations, as in the
case of liquidated damages generally, has exacerbated the confusion. Some courts, and even the
Service, feel compelled to decide whether particular amounts are interest or penalties. See, eg.,
Wusich v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 279, 287-88 (1960); Rev. Rul. 61-210, 1961-1 C.B. 31; Rev. Rul.
60-127, 1960-1 C.B. 84. The option of holding that the amounts are neither interest nor penalties
but represent damages would make classification easier.
61. Although the court noted the resemblance between the amounts in question and liquidated
damages, it did so only to the extent that it saw the late charge as compensating the bank for the
additional expenses it incurred as a result of the taxpayer's delinquency. 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1694,
1696 (1991). The court did not consider the possibility that all of the characteristics of the amounts
in question made them precisely like damages and that the amounts were not interest because they
were damages.
62. Although the law distinguishes between liquidated damages and penalties, enforcing those
which it finds to be the former but refusing to enforce those which it finds to be the latter (see
MCCORMICK, supra note 13, at § 146), the existence of that distinction should not suggest that
damages cannot serve to induce compliance or deter breach. For a consideration of the differences
between liquidated damages and penalties, see generally Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and
Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495 (1962); Justin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60
CAL. L. REv. 84 (1972); William S. Harwood, Comment, Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of the
Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1349 (1977); Kenneth W.
Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 351; see
also Southwest Eng'g Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.) (considering the difference be-
tween damages and a penalty), cerL denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965). Indeed, the very existence of
damages as part of the law of contract serves to induce compliance. If parties to a contract knew
that a breach would have no deleterious consequences (as would be the case if a breaching party did
not have to pay damages in lieu of providing the benefits expected from compliance), breaches would
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ment charges in question in West were not interest because they were
damages.
The tax court faced a similar quandary in Aames v. Commissioner.1
3
In Aames the taxpayer had obtained a judgment on a medical malprac-
tice claim. He had also received an amount denominated interest from
the date of the original injury to the date of judgment (so-called prejudg-
ment interest). Aames took the position that the entire amount recov-
ered was excluded from income by section 10 4 .14 The Service disagreed,
on the ground that prejudgment interest is interest and not damages. Af-
ter citing Kieselbach as well as some condemnation cases where the
courts had refused to find that prejudgment interest was part of the con-
detonation award eligible for nonrecognition treatment under section
1033,65 the tax court agreed with the Service.
The court's conclusion that the amounts in question did not come
within the purview of the exclusion provided by section 104 was correct.
Again, the problem was that it was so difficult for the court to reach that
result. The Aames court, and others which have addressed similar is-
sues,66 might have had an easier task had they entertained the proposi-
probably occur more often. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle" Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 554, 558 (1977). One might ask whether the notion of a contract
requires the allowance of damages for breach. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNTrAcTs 641 (1980) (contract law is based upon a concern directed
at relieving a party after a breach).
63. 94 T.C. 189 (1990).
64. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income "the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness," except to the extent that the amounts are punitive damages received "in connection
with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness."
65. Tiefenbrunn v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1566, 1572-74 (1980) (interest was compensation for
delay in payment and not part of the gain on the involuntary conversion of property entitled to
nonrecognition); Smith v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 107, 112 (1972) (lump sum payment in condemna-
tion settlement presumed to include interest under Pennsylvania law). Section 1033(a)(2)(A) allows
a taxpayer to elect not to recognize the gain upon an involuntary conversion, to the extent the
taxpayer uses the award to replace the condemned property within a given period of time. See also
Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1963) (interest awarded in lieu of ordinary
income taxpayer would have earned on the sums wrongly withheld, taxable as income); 320 East
47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894, 897-99 (2d Cir. 1957) (amount corporate taxpayer
received as interest on condemnation award taxable as "personal holding company income"); Com-
missioner v. Goldberger's Estate, 213 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1954) (interest on judgment treated as
income and subject to tax law in effect at judgment, not when claim was entered).
66. See, eg., Spangler, 323 F.2d 913; 320 East 47th St. Corp., 243 F.2d 894; Tiefenbrunn, 74
T.C. 1566; Smith, 59 T.C. 107; Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933) (interest found to be
added to amount of award, distinct and separately calculated); Granger v. Commissioner, 37 T.CM.
(CCH) 1849-23 (1978) (even where taxpayer could prove judgment did not fully compensate for loss,
interest specifically designated as such will be considered interest for tax purposes).
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tion that the amounts in question were damages for delay in payment and
ought to be taxable as such.
The damages analysis would not have changed the result in Aames,
West, and similar cases. The amount included in the taxpayer's income
in Aames would be included in his income under the damages analysis,67
and the amounts in question in West would still have been nondeduct-
ible. 8 The difference is that the courts could have employed a more di-
rect analysis. Indeed, several of the opinions exude an almost palpable
tension.69 The courts seem to want to hold that the amounts are interest,
presumably because they feel either nondeductibility or inclusion in in-
come is the right result, but they have to deflect the problem posed by the
absence of a loan. 0
The judicial hand-wringing could end if courts simply acknowl-
edged that although the amounts are compensatory, they are not interest
because there is no lending transaction. The amounts are more appropri-
ately characterized as damages. The real question is - damages for
what? Concluding that they are damages for delay, as many courts have
already acknowledged in the process of calling the amounts interest, 1
67. Although the amount would be characterized as damages under the proposed analysis, it is
probably not damages on account of personal injury, as required by § 104, unless the nonpayment is
found to be the result of a traditional tort-type claim. For a short discussion of § 104, see infra note
162.
68. In West v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1694 (1991), if the amount had been damages,
it would have been nondeductible because it was attributable to a personal, rather than a business or
income producing, activity. I.R.C. § 262. No provision allows a deduction for damages stemming
from personal activities. See Stem v. Carey, 119 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (amounts paid by
individuals arising out of automobile accident found not deductible as a casualty loss); Mullohand v.
Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 1331 (1929) (damages paid on account of automobile accident that oc-
curred when a car was used for pleasure, not business, held not deductible as a casualty loss).
69. See, eg., 320 East 47th St Corp., 243 F.2d 894 (the word interest put in quotation marks
throughout); Tiefenbrunn, 74 T.C. 1566 (the court is apparently so uncomfortable calling the
amounts interest that it puts the word in quotes); Smith, 59 T.C. at 107 n.1 (the court avoids con-
fronting the issue by stating that "[t]he terms 'detention damages,' 'interest,' 'delay damages,' and
'payment for delay in compensation' will be used interchangeably herein").
70. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 459 (1972) (amount added to judgment to com-
pensate for delay treated as interest and taxed as ordinary income). In that case the court noted that
"[o]rdinarily, interest is received pursuant to a contractual promise, but a taxpayer may realize inter-
est income from a nonconsensual withholding of his property." 58 T.C. at 462. This observation
shows that the court understood that, at a minimum, the absence of a consensual lending transaction
raised a question about the propriety of characterizing the amount as interest. The court would not
have had to face that issue if it had analyzed the amounts in question as damages. Under the dam-
ages analysis, the amounts would still have been included in the taxpayer's income because they
substituted for an amount (interest) that is ordinary income. The difference is that the damages
analysis would have made it unnecessary for the court to struggle to conclude that the amounts were
interest.
71. See Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1963); 320 East 47th St. Corp. v.
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reaches the fight result without confusing the law. If the amounts were
damages for delay and not for personal injury, section 104 would not
necessarily exclude them from the recipient's income.72 Delay damages
would also fail to receive the favorable treatment accorded amounts re-
ceived in exchange for property." Courts could therefore reach the right
result in a much more theoretically direct and correct manner than is
possible under the substitution analysis now employed.
At its core, the damages analysis differs from the substitution analy-
sis because it focuses on the nature of the agreement between the par-
ties.74 Using a damages analysis, courts would determine what the
Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1957); Tiefenbrunn v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1566, 1571
(1980); Smith v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 107, 112 (1972); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 459,462
(1972).
72. The courts should not find it difficult to conclude that amounts which specifically compen-
sate for a harm separate from the tort-type personal injury are not part of the personal injury itself.
Of course, such a conclusion might create an inequity among: (1) those who receive a series of
payments which might be said to contain an interest element; (2) those who receive a lump sum plus
prejudgment interest; and (3) those who receive a lump sum which contains an amount designed to
compensate for the delay in receipt but which is not specifically designated as interest. Only the
individual who receives the lump sum plus prejudgment interest would not be allowed to exclude the
entire amount received. Whatever the demerits of such an inequity, it exists under the current law to
the same extent as it would if the proposed analysis were adopted. Compare Aames v. Commis-
sioner, 94 T.C. 189 (1990) (amount separately stated not excludable); and Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1
C.B. 34 (interest on fund not excludable) with F. L. McShane, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 409 (1987) (total
amount excludable); and Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75 (total amount excludable); and Rev. Rul.
79-220, 1979-1 C.B. 741 (total amount excludable). See Dodge, supra note 4.
73. Amounts which compensate for the sale or exchange of property would be part of the
amount realized and thus would either offset basis or produce capital gain. Cf Johnson & Co. v.
United States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945) (amount labeled interest on a condemnation award
treated as interest for federal income tax purposes even though the total amount of the award plus
the amount designated as interest was less than the taxpayer's basis in the property condemned.)
I.R.C. § 1001. Under certain circumstances, amounts which represent compensation for the prop-
erty might even be eligible for nonrecognition treatment. See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033, 1034.
74. The Service itself has used just such an analysis to conclude that an amount which compen-
sates a taxpayer for additional taxes due as a result of a misrepresentation by the other party to a
contract constitutes damages and is a nontaxable return of capital.
In Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,697 (Jan. 27, 1988), the Service declined to find that the amount re-
ceived by the taxpayer from the breaching party was income, because the receipt of the amount was
not tantamount to payment of the taxpayer's tax liability by another (citing Old Colony Trust v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929)). Instead, the Service noted that the taxpayer had been damaged
by the breach and concluded:
[TIhe fact that the reimbursement for the damage is measured by the amount of the
increased tax liability does not alter the fact that X's capital has been impaired by the
damage. Thus, even though the extent of the damage is measured by the increased tax
liability, the reimbursement is a return of additional expenses attributable to the
contract ....
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,697, at 9.
The Service's willingness to distinguish between the measure of an amount and the character of
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parties intended and tax the resulting payment accordingly. If the par-
ties did not intend to enter into a lending transaction, the amounts paid
should not be treated as interest.
The proposed analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to determining whether a debt exists. In United States v. Centen-
nial Savings Bank FSB,75 the Court held that although early withdrawal
penalties which a bank collected from depositors of CDs were income,
they were not income from the discharge of indebtedness. The analysis
which the Court used to reach that conclusion is very similar to that
proposed here.76 Both look to the nature of the relationship between the
parties to determine the appropriate tax treatment of the resulting trans-
fer of funds.77
The taxation of deficiency interest ought similarly to be grounded in
an examination of the relationship between the parties. The government
the amount is not new. In Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23, the Service ruled that an amount
received by a taxpayer from a preparer to compensate the taxpayer for the tax due as a result of the
preparer's mistake was not income to the taxpayer, notwithstanding that the receipt of the amount
had the same effect as the payment of the taxpayer's tax liability by the preparer. In Rev. Rul. 57-47
the Service reversed the position it had taken in Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939),
nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 45, acq., 1957-1 C.B. 4.
75. 111 S. Ct. 1512 (1991).
76. Reversing the decisions below in Centennial, the Supreme Court held that the early with-
drawal penalties did not constitute income from the discharge of indebtedness because the penalties
were not paid by the depositors to discharge the bank's liability to repay the entire amount initially
deposited. Id at 1517. The Court found the existence of a consensual relationship to borrow and
lend determinative of the existence of a debt. It noted that to determine whether a discharge of
indebtedness had occurred, "it is necessary to look at both the end result of the transaction and the
repayment terms agreed to by the parties at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship." Id. at
1518. In Centennial, the terms of the CD provided that in the case of early withdrawal the bank
would be liable to the depositor only for the amount of principal deposited and interest accrued up to
the date of withdrawal, minus the penalty. The Court found that the depositor had not forgiven the
bank's obligation to pay because the reduction in the amount due was part of the terms of the
original agreement. Indeed, the court concluded that the depositor could not have forgiven the
bank's obligation to repay the amount otherwise due because the agreement did not require the bank
to pay the full amount in the event of an early withdrawal. Id.
77. This analysis has the virtue of allowing the tax treatment of an amount to follow the reason
the amount was paid. Thus, it allows taxation to follow the substance, not the form, of a transaction.
As the Supreme Court noted close to sixty years ago in one of the most famous cases in tax law, "the
question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing
which the statute intended." Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). This principle is
firmly established in the tax law. See, eg., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein
v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752
(1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and
Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365 (1988); Mitchell M. Gans, Re-examining the Sham
Doctrine: When Should an Overpayment Be Reflected in the Basis?, 30 BuFF. L. REv. 95 (1981);
Hoffman F. Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law
of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REv. 355 (1963).
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ought not treat itself as entering into a debtor-creditor relationship with
taxpayers who underpay their taxes unless it wants to assume the role of
financier. Treating deficiency interest as interest treats the government
as if it were a lender and encourages the use of the tax system as a tool of
corporate finance. Because such a role is inappropriate for the govern-
ment, and because it is as least as sound to treat deficiency interest as
damages, the latter course should be seriously considered. Deficiency in-
terest can be viewed as damages that compensate the government for the
taxpayer's" retention of the amount of tax due. An examination of the
controversy surrounding the deductibility of corporate deficiency interest
will illustrate the benefits of adopting a more precise analysis.
III. THE CONTROVERSY OvER THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
CORPORATE DEFICIENCY INTEREST
Individuals cannot deduct deficiency interest.7" Corporations can.79
78. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1987). The Service takes the position that interest paid by
individuals on income tax deficiencies is personal interest regardless of the source of the income with
respect to which the tax liability arises. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i) (1987). Since
§ 163(h) disallows a deduction for personal interest, any interest which is characterized as personal
under the temporary regulations will not be deductible (unless the regulations are found to be inva-
lid). The temporary regulations exempt from the definition of personal interest any deficiency inter-
est other than income tax deficiency interest and deficiency interest which arises out of a C
corporation's tax liability. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163.9T(b)(2)(iii) (1987). Some commentators
have assailed the position taken in the regulations, arguing that it lacks statutory or other support.
See David R. Brennan & Susan L. Megaard, Deducting Interest on Noncorporate Trade or Business
Tax Deficiencies: Uncertainty Exists Under the New Temporary Regulations, 13 REv. TAx'N INDI-
VIDUALS 22 (1989); John Y. Taggart, Denial of the Personal Interest Deduction, 41 TAX LAW. 195,
260-62 (1988). For a discussion of the impact of the Service's position on the treatment of deficiency
interest paid or incurred by individuals and on the tax preparers ability to take an aggressive, and
contrary, position without incurring liability for penalties, see William L. Raby, Is It a Business
Expense When the Self-Employed Pay Interest on Deficiencies or Accounting Fees?, 54 TAX NOTEs
683 (1992).
Brennan and Megaard argue that the temporary regulations go too far in classifying all deficiency
interest as personal interest. Although they believe that classifying as personal any deficiency inter-
est which would not qualify as a § 162 trade or business expense follows logically from the statute
and legislative history, Brennan and Megaard maintain that extending that classification to all defi-
ciency interest, including that arising from a business related deficiency, follows neither from the
statute nor the legislative history. Indeed, they assert that the position which the Service took in the
temporary regulations can be traced to a statement made in the JOINT COMMITTEE'S GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 266 (Comm, Print 1987)
[hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION]. Brennan & Meggard, supra, at 26.
79. I.R.C. § 163(a). While the corporate interest deduction is neither unlimited nor un-
restricted, the limitations and restrictions upon it have arisen primarily out of a desire to curb the
use of debt for disfavored or abusive transactions. Thus, I.R.C. § 163(e) provides rules for the de-
duction of original issue discount, and I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) provides special rules pursuant to which a
portion of the original issue discount attributable to certain "high yield obligations" (as defined in
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During the fall of 1990 this disparity prompted one Congressman to in-
troduce a bill which would have provided equal treatment." Instead of
restoring the deduction for deficiency interest paid or incurred by indi-
viduals, however, the bill would have eliminated the deduction for corpo-
rations."' Both corporate taxpayers and the tax bar cried foul and
I.R.C. § 163(i)) is not deductible, but instead is treated as a dividend, I.R.C. § 163(t) denies an
interest deduction for interest paid or incurred on certain "registration-required obligations" which
are not in registered form; I.R.C. § 163(g) reduces the amount of the interest deduction for interest
paid or incurred on indebtedness with respect to which a § 25 mortgage credit certificate has been
issued; and I.R.C. § 163(j), the so-called "earnings stripping" provision, denies an interest deduction
for interest paid by a corporation to a related person if the corporation has excess interest expense
for a year (as defined in I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B)) and a debt equity ratio of more than 1.5 to 1.
Other provisions also limit the deductibility of interest. See, eg., I.R.C. § 264 (disallowing inter-
est on debt used to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance, endowment or annuity con-
tract or any life insurance policies covering the life of officer, employees or similar individuals);
I.R.C. § 265 (disallowing interest incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities); I.R.C. § 266
(disallowing carrying charges chargeable to a capital account); i.R.C. § 267 (disallowing interest
with respect to transactions between related persons); I.R.C. § 272(b)(1)(M) (limiting a corpora-
tion's ability to carry back net operating losses attributable to corporate equity reduction transac-
tions CCERTs')); I.R.C. § 279 (disallowing a deduction for interest on certain corporate acquisition
indebtedness); I.R.C. § 1055 (addressing the treatment of redeemable ground rents and real property
subject to liabilities). Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations, the general rule remains one of
deductibility.
80. On September 6, 1990, Rep. Fortney Stark (D. Cal.) introduced the "Interest Equity. Act of
1990," H.R. 5557, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also 136 CONG. REC. H7219 (daily ed. Sept. 6,
1990). Although the so-called "Democratic Alternative" introduced by the House Ways and Means
Committee on October 15, 1990, did not contain any provision like Rep. Stark's proposal, the Senate
Finance Committee's "Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990" contained a provision practically iden-
tical to the Stark proposal. See Ways and Means Releases Summary of Democratic Budget Alterna-
tive, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-7, Oct. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File;
Senate Finance Comm. Report for Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 212-
31, Oct. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. Section 7462 of the Senate bill
would have added § 163(k) to the Code. The new section would have been entitled "Disallowance of
Deduction for Interest on Unpaid Corporate Taxes."
The proposal had a very simplistic objective: equalizing the treatment of corporations and indi-
viduals. That objective is simplistic because corporations are taxed differently from individuals in
many respects. For example, corporations are subject to a different alternative minimum tax, are
entitled to a deduction for all or part of the amount of dividends received, cannot deduct capital
losses except to the extent of capital gains, are not subject to the concept of adjusted gross income,
receive no standard deduction or personal exemptions, and incur no gift tax liability when they make
gifts.
For a more thorough exploration of the differences in the income taxation of corporations and
individuals, see BoIus I. BrIrKER & JAMFS J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 5-1 to 5-10 (5th ed. 1987). The principle of horizontal equity does
not require that all taxpayers be treated similarly; it requires only that similarly situated taxpayers be
treated similarly. The focus of the inquiry should therefore be on whether corporate and individual
taxpayers are similarly situated with respect to the payment of interest on tax deficiencies.
81. The bill would have equalized the situation by adding a provision which would have disal-
lowed any deduction for any deficiency interest paid by any taxpayer. Thus, section 2 of the bill
would have added a new subsection to § 163, as follows:
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promptly mounted a full court press to demonstrate the folly of such a
misguided idea. 2
In large part, they succeeded. The Revenue Reconciliation Act of
199013 does not deny corporations a deduction for deficiency interest. It
does, however, increase the rate of interest in the case of large underpay-
ments, defined as those totaling $100,000 or more for any taxable year.84
(k) Disallowance of deduction for interest paid on tax obligations.
(1) In general. In the case of any taxpayer, no deduction shall be allowed under
this chapter for interest on tax obligations paid or accrued during the taxable year.
(2) Interest paid or accrued on tax obligations. For purposes of this subsection,
the term 'interest paid or accrued on tax obligations' means any interest paid or
accrued on the following amounts:
(A) Any amount required to be paid by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(B) Any amount for which a deduction is allowed under Section 164 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(C) Any additions to taxes that are described in (A) and (B) above; or
(D) Any amount for which a tax credit is allowed under Section 901 or 903
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
The new provision would have applied to payments made after January 1, 1991. Id. § 3.
Because § 163(k), as proposed, would have disallowed all deductions for deficiency interest, it
would have made it clear that Congress did not disagree with the Treasury's interpretation of the
scope of § 163(h)(2), as reflected in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1987). Far from disapproving of
that interpretation, Congress would have almost explicitly approved it. For a critique of the position
taken in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T, see Brennan & Megaard, supra note 78.
82. On October 15, 1990, Tax Notes published a letter by James S. Eustice, of counsel for the
firm of Kronish, Lieb, Wiener & Hellman, New York, dated September 27, 1990, in which Mr.
Eustice enumerated at least ten reasons why Rep. Stark's bill should be rejected as "tax policy at its
worst." Letters to the Editor, 49 TAX NoTEs 355, 356 (1990). Mr. Eustice was not alone in his
opposition to Rep. Stark's bill.
On September 26, 1990, several members of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Associa-
tion, speaking for themselves and not for the American Bar Association or the Section of Taxation,
filed extensive Comments on Rep. Stark's bill. See ABA Section Members Oppose Bill Denying Cor-
porations a Deduction for Interest Paid on Tax Deficiencies, 90 TAx NoTEs TODAY 200-26, Sept. 28,
1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. The Comments concluded that "the proposal
has nothing to recommend it and should not be included in any deficit reduction package." Id.
On September 26, 1990, William M. Paul, of Covington & Burling, wrote to Roy Strowd, Attor-
ney Advisor at Treasury's Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, enclosing a list of 14 points for the
Office of Tax Policy to consider in evaluating Rep. Stark's bill. Covington and Burling Suggest Nu-
merous Reasons Why Interest Disallowance Proposal is Inappropriate, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 210-56,
Oct. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
On September 28, 1990, a group of nearly 90 corporations and industry associations wrote to
Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Treasury Secretary For Tax Policy, to voice their opposition to the
proposed disallowance of interest paid on corporate tax underpayments. Corporations Oppose Limit-
ing Deductions for Interest Paid on Tax Obligations, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 210-54, Oct. 15, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
83. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11341(a), 104 Stat. 1388-1470
(1990).
84. The Act amended § 6621 by adding § 6621(c). Section 6621(c) provides that 30 days after
the earlier of either the date that the first letter of proposed deficiency is sent (the 30-day letter) or
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The increase is two percentage points and applies only after the taxpayer
receives a notice of deficiency or proposed deficiency. 85 Practitioners
have dubbed the increased rate "hot interest.
86
The enactment of the hot interest provision does not resolve the
question of the proper federal income tax treatment of deficiency interest.
Under current law, corporate taxpayers can easily use the federal govern-
ment as an unquestioning provider of funds at costs that have nothing to
do with the creditworthiness of the corporation, the value or existence of
collateral, or the length of time for which the loan will be outstanding.
The net operating loss carryback provisions, 7 the quick refund proce-
the date that the deficiency notice provided by § 6212 is sent (the 90-day letter), interest on certain
large underpayments of tax due from corporate taxpayers will begin to accrue at a rate five percent-
age points above the federal short-term rate, rather than the usual three percentage points above the
federal short-term rate, as provided by § 6621(b). In cases where the deficiency procedures do not
apply, interest begins to accrue at the increased rate 30 days after the Service sends the first notice of
assessment or proposed assessment. Section 6621(c) generally applies to interest which accrues after
December 31, 1990.
On December 14, 1990, the Treasury issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Temporary
Regulations (T.D. 8325, 1991-1 C.B. 233) implementing § 6621(c) and setting forth certain transi-
tional rules. The Service has suggested that the only way to avoid the imposition of the higher rate
of interest is either to pay the tax or make a deposit in the nature of a cash bond pursuant to Rev.
Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 C.B. 501. See Corporate Taxes, Increased Interest Rate Applies to Amounts
Being Litigated in Tax Court, BNA DAILY TAX RaP., Dec. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, BNADTR File.
85. This provision, too, has been assailed as "a poorly-thought-out, ill-advised attempt to raise
revenues through manipulation of tax procedural rules." Richard C.. Stark, The Hot Interest
Nightmare, 50 TAX NoTs 1409, 1417 (1991). See also Donald C. Alexander & Michael I. Saltz-
man, principal authors, NYSBA Calls for Change in Large Corporate Underpayment Provisions, 91
TAX NoTEs TODAY 125-77, June 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, reprinted
sub nom. New York State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on Practice and Procedure, Report
on Section 6621(c) Providing for Increased Interest Rate on Large Corporate Deficiencies and Temp.
Reg. 301.6621-3T, 52 TAX NoTEs 203 (1991) (hereinafter Report on Section 6621(c)). That it may
have been poorly thought out is not surprising, however, because it was the product of a political
compromise, and received little deliberate thought. Id. at 204-05.
The proposed regulations under § 6621(c) have also produced considerable controversy. See, eg.,
Public Comments on Proposed Regulations, 51 TAX NoTEs 34-36 (1991), noting six separate com-
ment letters filed by: Price Waterhouse (91 TAX NoTEs TODAY 71-27), the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (91 TAX NoTEs TODAY 72-21), Ernst & Young (91 TAX NoTEs TODAY 73-32), Sun
Company (91 TAx NoTEs TODAY 73-33), the Tax Section of the District of Columbia Bar Associa-
tion (91 TAX NOTES TODAY 73-34), and KPMG Peat Marwick (91 TAX NOTEs TODAY 73-35), all
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. All of those comments were critical. At a hearing
held on April 2, 1991 on the proposed regulations, those who testified were also critical of the pro-
posals. See Juliann Avakian-Martin, IRS Lukewarm to Industry Coolness Over Proposed Hot Interest
Regs, 51 TAX NoTEs 13 (1991).
86. See, eg., Stark, supra note 85; Avakian-Martin, supra note 85.
87. Section 172 allows a taxpayer to carryback a net operating loss 3 years. I.R.C. § 172(b).
Thus, a taxpayer that takes a return position which results in a net operating loss for that year may
use that position to obtain a refund of taxes previously paid.
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dure s and the length of time that it takes to settle a tax controversy 89 all
make that possible.90 By taking an aggressive return position, a finan-
cially distressed corporate taxpayer can receive (or free up) capital on
terms which no commercial lender would provide.91 By treating defi-
ciency interest as interest and allowing corporate taxpayers to deduct it,
the Code treats such taxpayers as if they had actually borrowed from a
commercial lender. Such favorable treatment invites exploitation be-
cause a taxpayer that frees up capital either by underpaying its taxes or
by receiving a refund which it must ultimately repay is in a very different
position from a taxpayer that borrows from a commercial lender. An
examination of the quick refund procedure shows the extent to which
this is true.
Under the quick refund procedure, a taxpayer can file a claim for a
refund of amounts paid for a taxable year affected by a net operating loss
carryback.92 The Service must act on the claim within 90 days.93 In
88. Section 6411 allows taxpayers to file a claim for a tentative carryback adjustment for a
taxable year affected by a net operating loss carryback. Section 641 l(d) allows a taxpayer to obtain a
quick refund of tax due under § 1341(b) (relating to repayments of amounts received under a claim
of right). Section 6425 allows the taxpayer to obtain an even quicker refund of an overpayment of
estimated tax. The Service has to act on an application for such a refund in 45 days. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6425-3 (1970).
Section 6405(b) provides that § 6405(a), which requires submission of information on any refund
claim for more than $1,000,000 to the Joint Committee on Taxation 30 days prior to payment, does
not apply to credits or refunds due as a result of a tentative carryback adjustment.
89. Although much has been said and written about a tax court backlog, the length of time it
takes to settle a tax controversy is attributable to more than any tax court backlog that might exist.
It takes time for an audit to begin and even more time to finish. It is not unusual for the process to
take several years. Once a deficiency is assessed, resolution through the courts is not immediate. See
Meade Whitaker, Some Thoughts on Current Tax Practice, 7 VA. TAX REv. 421 (1988); William F.
Nelson & James J. Keightley, Managing the Tax Court Inventory, 7 VA. TAX. REV. 451 (1988).
90. That taxpayers can use the quick refund procedure to obtain a quick infusion of cash from
the federal government does not suggest that the provisions which allow it are inherently flawed.
The provisions exist for sound reasons, and the length of time it takes to resolve tax matters often
results from the complexity of the matters and from other factors unrelated to the taxpayer's desire
to obtain quick cash. See supra note 89. Nevertheless, the existence of the provisions and the fre-
quency with which they are used suggests that there is an opportunity for taxpayers to obtain funds
on terms very different from those which the typical commercial lender would require.
91. The Supreme Court recognized this possibility as early as 1942. In Meilink v. Unemploy-
ment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564, 567 (1942), the Court noted: "A rate of interest on tax
delinquencies which is low in comparison to the taxpayer's borrowing rate - if he can borrow at all -
is a temptation to use the state as a convenient, if involuntary, banker by the simple practice of
deferring the payment of taxes."
92. I.RC. § 6411(a).
93. I.R.C. § 6411(b). Treas. Reg. § 301-6411-1(a) (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-3(a) (1974);
Rev. Rul. 78-369, 1978-2 C.B. 324, amplified by Rev. Rul 84-175, 1984-2 C.B. 296; see Pearl Zarnow
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 213 (1967); Rev. Rul. 67-313, 1967-2 C.B. 413. The claim is filed on form
1139 (corporations) or 1045 (individuals). Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-1(b) (1960). See HARROP A. FREE-
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addition to the speed with which the Service must act on the claim, the
procedure is notable because the Services's review is limited to the cor-
rectness of mathematical computations and the application of the text of
the law.94 Moreover, the Service will issue the refund even when the
amount of the refund is in excess of $1,000,000, which would normally
require the Joint Committee's concurrence." The quick refund proce-
dure thus gives taxpayers a tremendous opportunity to receive an infu-
sion of funds, subject only to the usual rules regarding the reasonableness
of positions taken on tax returns. Indeed, the authors of a treatise on tax
practice openly acknowledge that the quick refund procedure serves to
inject "a new transfusion of financial blood into a loss corporation." 96
No commercial lender would remit funds after verifying only the
mathematical correctness of the application. Of course, the ease with
which a taxpayer can receive money under the quick refund procedure
might be justified on the ground that the taxpayer is only asking for its
own money back. Such a taxpayer, the argument would run, should
have to do no more to obtain that money than if the taxpayer had merely
failed to remit it in the first place.97 Yet, in that argument lies the prob-
lem. As a matter of policy, a taxpayer that either receives a quick refund
or is simply deficient in the payment of its tax liability ab initio is in such
a different position from one who borrows money from a commercial
lender that it should be treated differently for tax purposes. The addi-
MAN & NORMAN D. FREEMAN, THE TAX PRACTICE DESKBOOK 7-1, at 7-22 (1973) & Supp. at
S7-10 (1990); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE.AND PROCEDURE 11.03, at 11-12 (2d ed.
1991).
94. Thus, regulations specifically preclude the examining officer from making adjustments in
"the amount claimed on the return as a deduction for depreciation because he believes that the
taxpayer has claimed an excessive amount; likewise, he will not include in gross income any amount
not so included by the taxpayer, even though such officer believes that such amount is subject to tax
and properly should be included in gross income." Treas. Reg. § 1.6411-3(b) (1974). Rev. Rul. 78-
369, 1978-2 C.B. 324, confirms that the taxpayer's claim must be allowed if it contains no omissions
or errors of computations. Indeed, in the situation posed in that ruling, the claim was allowed even
though a deficiency had been proposed for the year to which the net operating loss was carried and
the proposed deficiency exceeded the amount of the tax plus the amount of the loss.
95. I.R.C. § 6405. See supra note 88.
96. FREEMAN & FREEMAN, supra note 93, 1 7-1, at 7-22 & Supp. at S7-10; see also SALTZMAN,
supra note 93, 11.03, at 11-12 ("[A] business may have an urgent need for a prompt refund of tax
97. One difficulty with this argument is that it does not apply to all refunds. The procedure
with respect to refunds other than the quick refunds allowed by §§ 6411 and 6425 differs from the
procedure for regular refunds both in the length of time in which the Service must act and in the
standard of review which it must apply. I.R.C. §§ 6404, 6405; see FREEMAN & FREEMAN, supra
note 93, 7-1, at 7-8 to 7-11, 7-18 to 7-22 & Supp. at S7-5.
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tional amounts paid, though labeled interest in both cases, are so differ-
ent that they merit different tax treatment.
A tax system that fails to recognize and treat these additional
amounts differently fails to treat transactions in accordance with their
substance. Such a system also encourages the use of taxation as a tool of
corporate finance, which is both expensive for the government 98 and in-
equitable with respect to individual taxpayers. It also calls into question
the characterization of deficiency interest as interest.
A. The Difference Between Interest and Damages
Interest has long been defined as an amount paid for the use or for-
bearance of money.99 The traditional analysis has stopped there, and
much energy has been spent trying to identify amounts which embody
those characteristics."c° But perhaps the analysis should continue. To
determine whether an amount is interest or something else, the law
should begin by identifying the elements of a transaction in which inter-
est unquestionably exists.
A commercial lending transaction provides the perfect benchmark
for comparison. 101 In a commercial transaction one party transfers
98. Even if the rate at which the government borrows money was precisely the same as the
deficiency interest rate, the existence of a tax deficiency leaves the government in a loss position
because of the transactional costs of asserting and collecting the deficiency and the costs inherent in
the existence of deficiencies which the government never discovers, assesses and collects.
99. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965); Deputy v. DuPont, 308
U.S. 448, 498 (1940); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932) (defining interest
as "the amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money"); Investors Ins.
Agency v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982). In United States v. Childs, 266 U.S.
304 (1924), the Court explained that interest was "a means of compensation. Bouvier['s Law Dic-
tionary] defines it to be 'a consideration paid for the use of money or for forbearance in demanding it
when due.'" Id. at 307.
100. See supra note 8.
101. Commercial interest provides an ideal standard for comparison for several reasons. First,
in a commercial lending transaction the parties are, by hypothesis, dealing at arm's length. Second,
the Code itself sets transactions undertaken by parties dealing at arm's length as the standard by
which the tax characterization of specific transactions are measured. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (adopt-
ing the arm's length standard to determine the real nature of transactions between related parties);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (defining fair market value as "the price at which
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts"). The
arm's length standard appears to be the tax law's equivalent of the tort law's reasonable person.
Third, the Supreme Court agrees. In Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564
(1942), the Court looked to commercial interest to determine whether an amount set by a California
statute represented interest due priority even in bankruptcy, or a penalty, not entitled to such prior-
ity. It also noted that the legislature's decision to "include compensation to the state for the in-
creased costs of administration in the exaction for delay in paying taxes" did not convert the amount
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money to a second party and the second party agrees to repay the
amount transferred, with interest to compensate the first party for having
parted with the money. Like the transactions which result in the pay-
ment of interest under the traditional analysis, a commercial transaction
involves one party's use or forbearance of another's money. It fits the
traditional and accepted definition of the term interest." 2
However, a transaction that results in the payment of commercial
interest possesses at least one other characteristic which the law ought to
consider. Commercial interest results from a voluntary transaction in
which the parties expect an extension of credit to exist. Voluntariness is
also a common element in many of the transactions in which courts have
struggled to identify the existence of interest. Such transactions, which
include interest free loans and installment sales as well as transactions
that contain original issue discount, all involve consensual transactions,
the economic consequences of which are both expected and intended."13
Taxpayers and the government have differed only about what those eco-
nomic consequences are.
The suggestion that there should be a consensual extension of credit
in any transaction found to carry an amount labeled interest follows from
the seminal definition of interest. The law should not conclude that an
amount was paid for the "use or forbearance of money"" 4 unless one
party allows another to use its money or willingly forbears its collec-
tion.105 Two factors should coalesce. There should be an extension of
into a penalty. Id. at 567. Unfortunately, the Court limited its analysis to distinguishing interest
from penalties and did not consider whether the compensatory nature of the amounts in question
made them something else. See also Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
102. See supra note 99.
103. In all of these transactions, as well as in other delayed payment transactions, the parties
agree on the amount to be paid and the time at which it is to be paid.
104. The Supreme Court has so defined interest. See supra note 99.
105. The tax court has noted that "for a transaction to be considered a loan, both parties to the
transaction at the time the funds were furnished must have reached an actual agreement to establish
a debtor-creditor relationship." Barrow v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 935, 937-38, 937 n.2
(1983). More recently, the tax court has emphasized the importance of the existence of a loan. In
Albertson's Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 415 (1990), the tax court had to decide whether an
amount designated as interest under certain nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements and
accrued by the employer was deductible as interest when accrued. The court held that it was not
interest because there was no loan. First, the court reviewed the standard definitions of interest and
concluded that "[i]mplicit in these... definitions of interest is the concept that interest is a payment
for the use of money that the lender had the legal right to possess, prior to relinquishing possession
rights to the debtor." Id. at 421. The court concluded that the amounts in question did not "consti-
tute liabilities owed to the [employees] for the 'forbearance' of money whose payment had become
due." Id. at 422. As the court noted:
The fact that certain amounts are described as interest by the parties to an agreement
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credit and the extension of credit should be consensual. Courts have
long recognized the need to find an extension of credit.10 6 Perhaps they
should now acknowledge the importance of consent.
The terms "use" and "forbearance" imply a voluntary act.107 The
and are calculated by applying a percentage rate per annum to some principal amount
does not mean that the amounts will be deductible as interest for income tax purposes.
Autenreith v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'g. 41 B.T.A. 319
(1940).
[The employees] never had any legal basis to demand payment of the deferred amounts,
and [the employer] never had an obligation to pay deferred compensation in the year in
issue. [The employer] could not have "borrowed" something from the [employees] that
[the employees] never had the right to possess. One cannot forgo something to which
one never had a right. One cannot lend that which one never had a right to possess, and
[the employer] cannot borrow money that it always had the right to possess.
Id at 423 (emphasis in original).
Although Albertson's addresses what is essentially a question of timing because the court need not
decide whether the amounts, when actually paid, represent interest, it is nonetheless illuminating.
The court's analysis is perceptive, and supports the conclusion that deficiency interest is not interest.
As with the amounts deferred by the employer in Albertson's, a taxpayer who has been assessed a
deficiency should not be treated as a borrower of money which it is claiming is its own money.
Albertson's stands for the proposition that an amount should not be treated as interest for tax pur-
poses unless there is a loan. Like the employer in Albertson's, a taxpayer who must pay the amount
of a deficiency does not pay interest thereon because there is no loan.
106. For example, in Autenreith v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'g. 41
B.T.A. 319 (1940), the court noted that "in order to be deductible [interest] must be paid on indebt-
edness, which, under the Revenue Acts, means on an unconditional and legally enforceable obliga-
tion for the payment of money." See also Commissioner v. Park, 113 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1940);
Barrow v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 935, 937-38, 938 n.2 (1983); Albertson's Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 95 T.C. 415 (1990).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to find an extension of credit, a loan,
before finding income from the discharge of indebtedness. In United States v. Centennial Say. Bank
FSB, 11 S. Ct. 1512 (1991), discussed in the text accompanying notes 75-77, supra. The significance
of Centennial is not in its holding but in the Court's analysis. To the extent that the Court began by
deciding whether the parties had created an indebtedness, Centennial supports the analytical ap-
proach suggested here.
107. Id The Court's employment of the terms use and forbearance in tandem contemplates a
voluntary, not a manipulative, exploitative or otherwise nonconsensual, act. Use or forbearance can
fairly be distinguished from seizure, confiscation or impoundment, all of which imply an absence of
voluntariness or consent. WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 2012 (Deluxe
Color, Unabridged 2d ed. 1977) defines the term "use" as:
1. the act of using or the state of being used. usage; 2. the power or ability to use; as, he
has regained the use of his hand. 3. the right or permission to use; as, he granted them
the use of his name. 4. the need, opportunity, or occasion to use; as, we will have no
further use for his services. 5. way of using. 6. the quality that makes a thing useful or
suitable for a given purpose; advantage; usefulness; worth; utility. 7. the object, end, or
purpose for which something is used. 8. function; service. 9. constant, continued, cus-
tomary, or habitual employment, practice, or exercise, or an instance of this; custom;
habit; practice; wont. 10. in law, (a) the enjoyment of property, as from occupying,
employing, or exercising it; (b) [influenced by OFr. ues, gain, from L. opus, a work.]
profit, benefit, or advantage, especially that of lands and tenements held in trust by an-
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retention of money owed notwithstanding that the party to whom it is
owed has demanded payment produces a transaction which does not in-
volve a consensual extension of credit. Instead, it produces a transaction
in which one party injures another. Thus, any amounts eventually paid
to the injured party should be treated as damages. Where a tax defi-
ciency exists, the government has demanded payment and has not con-
sented, either explicitly or implicitly, to the taxpayer's retention of the
amounts due10 8 - the government has been involuntarily injured by the
taxpayer's retention of the amount owed. The amounts due from the
taxpayer should therefore not be treated as interest, but as damages.
Courts have recognized the importance of a consensual extension of
credit to a finding that an amount is interest for tax purposes. 109 In a
series of cases involving the condemnation of property by a state, courts
made clear that interest requires a voluntary extension of credit in the
exercise of the power to borrow. Thus, courts have consistently held that
an amount labeled interest paid by a state in connection with the con-
other. 11. in liturgy, the particular form of ritual or liturgy practiced in a given church,
diocese, etc.; as, the Lutheran use. 12. common occurrence. [Rare.]
It defines the term forbearance as:
1. the act of forbearing. 2. the quality of being forbearing; self-control; patient restraint.
Have a continent forbearance, till the speed of his rage goes slower. -Shak. 3. in law, an
extension of time for the payment of a debt.
Ia at 715. All of the foregoing definitions imply a consensual act.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 144-56.
109. Even the early cases seem to have recognized the importance of consent. See cases cited
supra note 99. In Old Colony v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932), the Court noted that "the
usual import of the term [interest] is the amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of
borrowed money." Ia at 560. In Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), the Court also recognized
that finding a consensual agreement to borrow and lend was essential to a finding of something that
could be characterized as interest for federal income tax purposes. In that case the Court began by
acknowledging the importance of finding an indebtedness and then went on to explain that
"although an indebtedness is an obligation, an obligation is not necessarily an 'indebtedness' within
the meaning of the [predecessor of § 163]." Ia at 497. The Court in Dupont specifically rejected the
notion that all carrying charges could be interest even though all of them might give rise to an
obligation. Id.
In 1957 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used the existence of consent to analyze the
question of whether an amount labeled interest on a condemnation award should be considered
interest for purposes of the personal holding company tax. See 320 East 47th St. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957). In that case, the court saw the issue as whether interest in-
cluded amounts paid for the use of money without the taxpayer's consent. Id. at 896.
Unfortunately, like the Ninth Circuit in Commissioner v. Raphael, 133 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1943), the
Second Circuit in 320 East 47th St Corp. relied on Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S.
84 (1934), to reach its decision. It concluded that the amount in question was interest because
Congress must have meant to include such amounts within the definition of personal holding com-
pany income. The court apparently did not feel that it could reach what it thought was the correct
result-including the amounts in income-without concluding that they were interest.
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demnation of a taxpayer's property is not interest within the meaning of
section 103 because the amount is not paid in the exercise of the state's
borrowing power. 11° In Holley v. United States,III the court specifically
distinguished cases in which the state had purchased land from cases in
which it had condemned it. It noted that the purchase cases involved a
consensual transaction whereas the condemnation cases did not.' 1 2 The
court thus made the existence of a consensual transaction determinative.
The analysis that the courts have employed in this area is sound -
the courts determine the purpose of the statutory provision and use that
110. See, eg., Stewart v. Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983); Drew v. United States,
551 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1977); American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970);
Holley v. United States, 124 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942); Conyngham v.
Commissioner, 81 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1936) (per curiam); Robinson v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 1018
(2d Cir. 1935), cerL denied, 298 U.S. 663 (1936); J. & J. Rogers Co. v. Helvering, 80 F.2d 1014 (2d
Cir. 1936) (per curiam); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1935); United
States Trust Co. v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 683 (1933); Williams
Land Co. v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 154 (Ct. Cl. 1940); Posselius v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 161
(Ct. Cl. 1940); Wiltsie v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 743 (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 664
(1934); King v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1113 (1981); Schoen v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1075
(1934); Bandes v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 99 (1933); Bliss v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 803 (1933);
Isham v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1040 (1932); Klein v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 745 (1932);
Barrow v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 935 (1983); Rev. Rul. 72-77, 1972-1 C.B. 28, supersed-
ing Gen. Couns. Mem. 10,043, 10-2 C.B. 124 (1931); Iske v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1161
(1980), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming tax court in unpublished opinion), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981).
Although these cases purport to determine whether the obligation to pay a percentage rate is an
"obligation" within the meaning of § 103 or its predecessors, and with one exception (Halley v.
United States, 124 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942), where the court found the
amount labelled interest to be part of the award itself, following the reasoning of Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923), see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text), do not
explicitly consider whether the amounts are interest, it is the reasoning employed by all of these
courts, and even by the Service, that is significant. It is significant that the courts explicitly consider
whether the amounts are paid in the exercise of the state's (or municipality's) borrowing power, and
that their conclusion that they are not is deterninative of whether the amounts are exempt from
federal income tax under § 103 or its predecessors. That most of these courts do not consider the
interest question separately is simply another example of the problem addressed in this Article: the
assumption that compensatory amounts measured by a percentage rate are interest.
111. 124 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942).
112. The court in Holley held:
The decisions cited by appellant deal with situations where interest on obligations actu-
ally created by the borrowing power was held to be exempt under the statute. Cases
where landowners voluntarily sold property to governmental units [Commissioner v.
Meyer, 2 Cir., 104 F.2d 155; Kings County Development Co. v. Commissioner, 9 Cir.,
93 F.2d 33] [cert. denied, 304 U.S. 559 (1938)] are not controlling here.
124 F.2d at 911. In so doing the court accepted the distinction between consensual transactions,
which can give rise to the extension of credit and the payment of interest, and transactions which are
not consensual. See also Kings County Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 33, 34 (9th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 559 (1938).
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purpose to establish whether the amounts in question should constitute
interest. 113 The Service has also employed this analysis.1 14 The analysis,
as employed by the courts and by the Service in the condemnation cases,
asks the question suggested here: Did the transaction involve a consen-
sual extension of credit? If it did, the amounts should be treated as inter-
est. If it did not, they should not.
As in the condemnation cases, the existence of a consensual exten-
sion of credit should be critical in determining whether an amount is
interest generally. Using such an analysis will ensure that amounts will
be treated as interest for tax purposes only when doing so is consistent
with the purpose for the existence of the interest deduction.' 15 Although
Congress failed to set forth its original reason for enacting an interest
deduction, 1 6 the deduction is now acknowledged to be necessary to
achieve equity between those who possess and those who borrow capi-
tal. 17 By treating the cost of capital as a cost of producing income, the
interest deduction reduces the cost of capital and thus encourages capital
113. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
114. Rev. Rul. 72-77, 1972-1 C.B. 28. In that ruling the Service held:
The obligation of a State to pay compensation for property taken for public purposes
arises as a result of the exercise of a State's power of eminent domain, not as a result of,
or in the course of, the exercise of a State's borrowing power. Therefore, a tax upon the
interest paid on such an obligation does not adversely affect the State's power to borrow
money.
Although the Service began its analysis correctly, it made a common misstep when it failed to con-
sider whether the state's failure to provide compensation in eminent domain proceedings, as an
exercise of its borrowing power, made the unpaid amounts something other than interest. One possi-
ble explanation of the Service's failure to take this extra analytical step is that the issue before it was
only whether the amounts in question were interest for the purposes of the § 103 exemption. Find-
ing that the amounts did not fall into the exception, the Service did not need to reach the question of
how the amounts should be classified.
115. An emphasis of the consensual nature of a transaction should not inhibit the tax law's
ability to find hidden interest. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
116. See, eg., Asinow, supra note 1, 749-50; Alvin C. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduc-
tion: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1586 (1974); Michael Asimow, Principle and Prepaid
Interest, 16 UCLA L. Rav. 36, 62-63 (1968). See also Calvin H. Johnson, Is An Interest Deduction
Inevitable?, 6 VA. TAX REv. 123 (1986); Michael J. MacIntyre, An Inquiry Into the Special Status of
Interest Payments, 1981 DUKE L.J. 765, 774; Alan Gunn, IsAn Interest Deduction For Personal Debt
a Tax Expenditure?, 1979 CANADIAN TAx'N 46 (Winter).
117. In Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), the court articulated the rea-
son for the existence of the interest deduction as follows: "[U]fan individual or corporation desires to
engage in purposive activity, there is no reason why a taxpayer who borrows for that purpose should
fare worse from an income tax standpoint than one who finances the venture with capital that other-
wise would have been yielding income." Id at 741. See also William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. 369,
625 (1971).
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formation.'" 8 However, by permitting taxpayers to contest the assess-
ment of a proposed deficiency prior to paying it, the government is seek-
ing neither to reduce the cost of capital nor promote capital formation."19
If the amounts due as a result of the delay in payment of taxes are to be
deductible, policies germane to tax administration and enforcement
should determine their deductibility. Policies applicable to the deduct-
ibility of qualitatively different, consensually determined amounts are in-
apposite, and should be irrelevant.
Consider two bilateral transactions. In the first transaction, one
party loans another $100. The parties agree that repayment will occur
on a date certain and will include interest at a stated rate. On the ap-
pointed date the borrower repays the loan, with interest at the stated
rate. In the second transaction, one party performs a service for another
and the other party agrees to pay therefor on a date certain. On the
appointed date the recipient of the services refuses to pay.' 20 The service
provider then brings a lawsuit and receives an award of $100, the value of
the services provided, plus an amount labeled interest from the date the
money was due. Now consider whether the recipients of the monies in
those two transactions are in the same position.
In the first transaction one party agreed to lend another money, and
to collect a specific amount for so doing. The transaction is the prototyp-
ical commercial lending transaction. In this transaction, one party al-
lows another to use its money or agrees to forbear the collection thereof
until an appointed time. There is consent to the postponement of receipt
and therefore there is no injury. The amount labeled interest in this
118. In Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the Court of
Claims noted that "[i]nterest, like an ordinary business expense, is allowed as a deduction from
income because it is a cost of producing income." Interest payments are as much a part of producing
income as any other business expense, thus, denying deductibility would make the tax "pro tanto" a
levy on gross income.
119. I.R.C. § 6213. See SALTZMAN, supra note 93, 1.05[l, at 1-29 to 1-30 ("Under the defi-
ciency method, a taxpayer may, without first paying the tax in issue, file a petition in the U.S. Tax
Court for a redetermination of the amount of the deficiency the Service claims is due."); see also
Lyddon & Co. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 951 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958); Gunn
v. Mathis, 157 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Ark. 1958). See generally James K. Wilkens & Thomas A.
Matthews, A Survey of Federal Tax Collection Procedure: Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers and
Internal Revenue Service, 1986 ALASKA L. REv. 269; J. Wendell Bayles, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
to Contest Tax Liability and Arrest Collection Efforts, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 423 (1987).
120. The same situation exists when there is a sale of goods rather than the provision of services,
and raises the question of whether what is commonly referred to as interest on trade credit in the
commercial world is properly viewed as interest or is more accurately viewed as liquidated damages.
See SCHWARTZ & ScoTT, supra note 13, at 548-53 (quoting JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 450-52 (4th ed. 1977)).
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transaction is treated as interest because it is the kind of amount which
can constitute a cost of doing business.
In the second transaction one party injured another by failing to pay
the amount due when it was due. The amount labeled interest in the
second transaction is not the type of amount which is an expected cost of
doing business and should not be treated under the same rules that gov-
ern general costs of doing business. The absence of consent creates an
injury and should prevent the amounts paid from being classified as
interest.
Two elements should coalesce for interest to exist: there should be a
debt 2 ' and the existence of the debt should arise out of a consensual
transaction. Although deficiency interest arises in a situation in which
there is a debt, deficiency interest would not be treated as interest under
the proposed two pronged test because deficiency interest does not in-
volve the voluntary extension of credit. The government neither trans-
fers money to the taxpayer nor consents to the taxpayer's retention of
money. 122 Nor does the government forbear the collection of the
amounts due123 - it is only injured by nonpayment. If an amount paid
121. Courts have long held that interest cannot exist without an underlying indebtedness. See,
eg., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1940);
Investors Ins. Agency v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982); Commissioner v.
Meyer, 104 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1939); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 460 (4th Cir.
1935). Indebtedness is an "unconditional and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of
money." Autenreith v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940), quoted in Investors Ins.
Agency, 677 F.2d at 1333. Merely the possibility of a future debt is not indebtedness. See Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976); Hutchinson v. United States, 90-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,573 (D. Or. 1990).
122. That there may be an indebtedness in such a situation is not enough. As the Supreme
Court noted in Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), that there may be an indebtedness is insuffi-
cient because not all indebtedness gives rise to what the Code should characterize as interest. Id. at
498.
123. The government does not forbear the collection of the tax, because the government has not
consented to the delay in payment. The Code establishes the time at which the payment of tax is
due. I.R.C. §§ 6072-6075. The government's failure to seize a taxpayer's assets immediately upon
the assessment of a deficiency does not proceed from consent to the existence of the deficiency, but
from the structure of our system of government which affords taxpayers constitutional protection of
property interests. Thus, §§ 6331-6344 provide detailed rules for the seizure of property for collec-
tion of taxes. The Code also ensures that taxpayers will not be deprived of property without due
process. Section 6213(a), which provides for a period of time (currently, 90 days) between assess-
ment and collection so that a taxpayer may contest the assertion in tax court, is designed to protect
the taxpayer's due process rights. See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1981); Gunn
v. Mathis, 157 F. Supp. 169, 177 (W.D. Ark. 1957). The Fifth Circuit has noted that the predecessor
of § 6213 (26 U.S.C. [1939] § 272(a)) was "not enacted as a mere idle gesture. The Commissioner is
as bound as the taxpayer is by its terms. This is made plain by the language of the statute." Max-
well v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1953). The Ninth Circuit held that the predecessor of
§ 6213 (26 U.S.C. [1926] § 274(a)) served as a guarantee to the taxpayer that he shall not be deprived
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to compensate for an injury is to be deductible at all, a policy other than
that which governs the tax treatment of the costs of doing business or
which responds to the desire to encourage capital formation ought to
support the deduction.
An analysis of the relative positions of the parties to a tax contro-
versy reveals that deficiency interest differs from commercial interest,
and thus from the type of charge which ought to be deductible as inter-
est, in at least two significant respects. First, unlike commercial interest,
deficiency interest does not reflect the risks assumed by the parties. It is
the product of a statute which neither distinguishes between the varying
risks taken by the government with respect to different taxpayers nor
takes into account the expected term of any loan that might exist.
Economically, it bears little resemblance to commercial, arms-length
interest.
Second, unlike commercial interest, deficiency interest is not the
product of a transaction which involves the consensual advancement of
credit. At no point does the taxpayer agree to borrow and the govern-
ment agree to lend, and at no point does the government actually lend
any money. Nor does the government consent to the taxpayer's late pay-
ment of the amount of tax due and voluntarily forbear its collection.
These two distinctions between commercial interest and deficiency
interest are explored further below.
1. The Irrelevance of Risk or Duration. In a commercial transac-
tion the amount charged as interest normally bears some relationship to
factors such as the risk taken by the lender and the duration of the bor-
rowing.124 Thus, the greater the risk, the higher the return.1 25 The
of administrative process, and must be read in the light most favorable to the taxpayer. Ventura
Consol. Oil Fields v. Rogan, 86 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 672 (1937).
Even the cases which hold that notice and an opportunity to be heard need not always precede a
collection action do so on the ground that a taxpayer's ability to sue for a refund protects her due
process rights. See, eg., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 599 (1931); Johnston v. Commis-
sioner, 429 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Lethert, 360 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1966).
124. These are only two of the factors which parties dealing at arms length use in setting the
interest rate for a specific loan. See EUGENE R. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT 60-64 (4th ed. 1986). In a commercial transaction, the characteristics of both the loan
and the borrower affect the interest charged. See JAMES C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGE-
MENT AND POLICY 450-52 (4th ed. 1977). Thus, although the prime rate serves as a benchmark for
the typical loan transaction, the actual interest rate charged varies with a number of factors. Id.
The Supreme Court agrees, noting in Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564,
567 (1942) that "[it is common knowledge that interest rates vary not only according to the general
use value of money but also according to the hazard of particular classes of loans."
125. Various factors go into the evaluation of risk. Thus, the borrower's level of debt-to-equity
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longer the term of the loan, the higher the charge.12 6 Other factors are
also important. Commercial lenders consider the amount of the loan, so
that generally the larger the loan, the lower the interest rate.127 Even the
geographical location of both borrower and lender affect the interest
rate. 128
Deficiency interest rates are not set with regard to any of those fac-
tors. The rate charged bears no relationship to the risk of nonpayment or
the taxpayer's financial condition. It bears no relationship to the length
of time during which the taxpayer owes the money, or to the amount of
money owed.1 29 The deficiency interest rate is strictly formulaic, set at
the rate at which the government has to pay interest on its own short-
term indebtedness, plus 3 percentage points. 130 Unlike a commercial in-
terest rate, which depends to a large extent on the borrower's circum-
stances,1 31 deficiency interest thus depends on one factor, and that factor
relates only to the government's circumstance. Because it focuses on det-
riment to the party who is owed rather than on attributes of the party
capital, deposit balances, and net income level may all affect the rate. See OLIVER G. WOOD, JR. &
WILLIAM C. BARKSDALE, JR., How TO BORROW MONEY 50 (1981). Lenders will also consider the
size and credit history of the borrower. See ELVIN F. DONALDSON & JOHN K. PFAHL, CORPORATE
FINANCE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 249 (3d ed. 1969). The existence of security for the loan is
also significant. Id.
126. As one basic finance text states, "interest rates on [long] term loans have been slightly
higher... than the [same] rate the bank would charge the same company on a short term loan or
line of credit." Id at 249-50; see also NEIL H. JACOBY & RAYMOND J. SAULNIER, TERM LENDING
TO BUSINESS 104 (1942); Joseph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long Term
Debt: Taking Into Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. REV. 335 (1989). There are
exceptions to this general rule, however. During periods of high inflation, short term loans may
carry higher rates than long term loans.
127. JACOBY & SAULNIER, supra.note 126, at 104; HAIM LEVY & MARSHALL SARNET, PRINCI-
PLES OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 44 (1988).
128. DONALDSON & PPAHL, supra note 125, at 249. See generally KENNETH W. SPARKS, SUC-
CESSFUL BUSINESS BORROWING 73-77 (1986).
129. Although the Code requires the daily compounding of deficiency interest, I.R.C. § 6622,
the rate itself does not vary with the length of time the deficiency is outstanding.
130. I.RLC. § 6621(a)(2). The Code defines the federal short-term rate as the rate determined
"by the Secretary in accordance with § 1274(d)." Section 1274(d) provides that the Federal short-
term rate is the "rate determined by the Secretary based on the average market yield (during any 1-
month period selected by the Secretary and ending in the calendar month in which the determination
is made) on outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remaining periods to ma-
turity of 3 years or less." I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C)(i).
That the Code sometimes provides for a rate higher than that set by § 6621, as it does in
§ 6621(c), is consistent with the argument that deficiency interest is not really interest but is intended
to accomplish other goals.
131. The borrower's credit history and the risk involved in the loan are two of these. See supra
notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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who owes, deficiency interest more closely resembles damages than com-
mercial interest.
The formulaic nature by which the deficiency interest rate is set
makes it even more unlike commercial interest. The additional percent-
age apparently reflects the additional costs which the government expects
to incur as a result of a taxpayer's noncompliance, 132 as well as the
knowledge that some deficiencies will be outstanding for a short period of
time while others will be outstanding for a long period of time.13 3 The
amount of the increase due to those factors is not tailored to the circum-
stances of the particular taxpayer in question, as it would be in the typi-
cal commercial situation.
The additional percentage serves as an inducement to payment of
the amount due. 13  Nevertheless, the additional percentage does not
convert deficiency interest into a penalty.135 No part of the additional
132. The Supreme Court has so acknowledged, albeit in the context of state determined deficien-
cies. See Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564, 567 (1942).
133. Deficiencies that are outstanding for a longer term would ordinarily carry a rate of interest
which is higher than the federal short-term rate. See supra note 126. Any desire to average out the
rate to account for the different periods of time during which deficiencies may be outstanding does
not convert deficiency interest into true interest, however. It is the absence of any relationship be-
tween the term of one taxpayer's retention of money and the rate charged, and the absence of a
consensual extension of credit that distinguishes deficiency interest from commercial interest.
134. The Supreme Court once noted that a deficiency interest rate higher than that applicable to
commercial transactions was reasonable because "[d]elinquent taxpayers as a class are a poor credit
risk; tax default, unless an incident of legitimate tax litigation, is, to the eye sensitive to credit
indications, a signal of distress." Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm'n, 314 U.S. 564, 567
(1942). While that observation may have been apt with respect to the unpaid employment taxes
which the Court considered in Meilink, it is not necessarily apt with respect to federal income taxes
generally. Unlike employment taxes, the determination of which is relatively straightforward and
free from controversy, the determination of the proper amount of federal income tax due is often
quite difficult and controversial. The existence of a federal income tax deficiency cannot generally be
said to indicate anything about the creditworthiness or financial condition of the taxpayer. It is
precisely this inability to make reasonable generalizations about the financial status of taxpayers as a
group that makes deficiency interest so unlike commercial interest. See generally infra note 138.
135. Much of the opposition to the proposal to deny the deductibility of deficiency interest has
taken the position that denying the deduction for corporate deficiency interest is tantamount to
making such interest a penalty. See generally supra note 82. That position must rest on the assump-
tion that the only difference between interest and a penalty is the deductibility of the former but not
the latter under current law. Courts have long held that deficiency interest is not a penalty, for
reasons that have nothing to do with its deductibility. United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 309-10
(1924) (deficiency interest defined as compensation, not penalty); Grauvogel v. Commissioner, 768
F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985) (I.R.C. § 6601(a) interest not a penalty but merely compensation in
the nature of interest on a loan); Johnson v. United States, 602 F.2d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 1979) (pre-
judgment interest represents compensation for the value of holding money over a period of time);
Avon Prods., Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 342, 343 (2d Cir. 1978) (interest not a penalty but
intended to compensate the government for delay in payment of a tax); Viek v. Phinney, 414 F.2d
444, 448 (5th Cir. 1969) (interest merely compensatory, not a penalty); Jones v. United States, 371
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amount of deficiency interest depends on fault, nor is any part of it as-
sessed on the basis of any element of intentional misbehavior. To say
that a provision induces compliance is not to say that it punishes non-
compliance. 136 Indeed, much of the invective against deficiency interest
has missed the point because those who believe that to assess it is inap-
propriate have maintained that deficiency interest is not interest because
it is a penalty.1 31 More likely, deficiency interest is not interest because it
is damages.
1 38
Deficiency interest bears a relationship to one thing only: the rate at
which the federal government borrows money. Deficiency interest sim-
F.2d 442 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (interest is a charge for use of tax money which the government was deprived
of using due to late payment). These courts are correct in holding that deficiency interest is not a
penalty, because it serves to compensate the government for the loss of the funds, not to punish the
taxpayer. See also Meiink, 314 U.S. 564, 567, in which the Court came to the same conclusion with
respect to deficiency interest imposed by a state statute.
136. Other provisions of the Code have also acted as inducements to compliance. The present
version of § 6621(c), the "hot interest" provision, will encourage prompt payment. See generally
Stark, supra note 85. Indeed, it is the mismatching of the label (interest) and the purpose or effect
(induced compliance) that makes this provision ill conceived. It calls something interest when that
thing is not interest at all. Similarly, the old version of § 6621(c), which provided for an increase in
the interest rate on substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions, (§ 6621(c),
as in existence until December 1989, defined a substantial underpayment as any underpayment ex-
ceeding $1,000 and applied an interest rate of 120 percent of the regular § 6621 rate to such under-
payments) was intended both to deter such transactions and to compensate the government for the
additional drain which such transactions place on the system. H. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1986); see also 132 CONG. REc. 7807 (1986). Those objectives do not serve to convert those
amounts into penalties, but neither do they allow the amounts to be classified as interest. They
actually serve to make the amounts like contractually determined liquidated damages. See supra
note 62 and accompanying text. An examination of whether the amounts labeled penalties under the
Code might more properly be characterized as damages is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf
GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 78, at 1272 (section 6651 penalty intended to compensate the
government for costs of collection).
137. See Garbis & Fisher, supra note 47.
138. The additional percentage serves to make deficiency interest like liquidated damages. In-
deed, some commentators see liquidated damages provisions as a necessary inducement to compli-
ance. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 62. Thus, stipulated damages clauses will be enforced
even though they serve to induce compliance with the terms of a contract. See generally KENNETH
W. CLARKSON El AL., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351
(1978). Such clauses are particularly appropriate when the amount of the damage suffered would be
difficult to measure. See generally MCCORmICK, supra note 13, at § 146 (defining the difference
between liquidated damages and penalties). Deficiency interest is similar to stipulated damages be-
cause measuring the damage to taxpayer morale and voluntary compliance which results from the
existence of large deficiencies owed by certain taxpayers, as well as the costs of enforcement, would
be difficult indeed.
The additional percentage is perhaps even more akin to contractually determined liquidated dam-
ages than the base rate. The additional percentage is an amount unrelated to the commercial interest
rate, and is designed to set a rate of compensation for harms that are difficult to measure. See supra
text accompanying notes 132-34.
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ply compensates the government for what it has lost as a result of the late
payment of the tax.1 39 Compensation is the language of damages. Dam-
ages are amounts paid for harm inflicted as a result of the actions of
another."4 A taxpayer's late payment of taxes injures the government by
depriving it of the use of money to which it was entitled. Deficiency
interest compensates the government for that injury.' The use of a per-
centage rate to measure the amount of compensation due the government
is sound,"az but it does not suffice to transmute compensation into inter-
est. In order for an amount to be interest another element should exist
- there should be consent to an extension of credit.1 43
139. Courts agree. In cases where deficiency interest is considered courts define such interest as
"compensation". See United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1924); Johnson v. United States,
602 F.2d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 1979); Vick v. Phinney, 414 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1969); Golden v.
United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9408, at 83,997 (W.D. Wash. 1984). Compensation is
not a term used when two parties have open dealings-it is the language of damages. Compensation
makes a party whole again, returning it to the status which it would have reached absent the inter-
vening event. Deficiency interest is "merely compensation for delayed payment in the nature of
interest on a loan." Grauvogel v. Commissioner, 768 F.2d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added). An interest calculation is the simplest way to differentiate the damage due to the existence
of large and small deficiencies over differing periods of time; merely because the amount assessed has
the "nature" of interest does not make it interest in its true form.
140. See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, I1 WILLISTON ON CorRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. 1969).
141. Courts have long recognized the compensatory purpose of deficiency interest, usually in
the context of distinguishing enforceable interest from nonenforceable penalties. Unfortunately,
courts have rarely taken the additional step of analyzing whether the compensatory nature of defi-
ciency interest does more than make it nonpunitive. See, eg., Grauvogel v. Commissioner, 768 F.2d
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[s]ection 6601(a) is not a penalty for late payment but merely compen-
sation for delayed payment in the nature of interest on a loan"); Johnson v. United States, 602 F.2d
734, 738 (6th Cir. 1979) (prejudgment interest provided under § 6601 is not of a "punitive charac-
ter"; it represents compensation for the value of holding of money over a period of time); Avon
Prods., Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 342, 343 (2d Cir. 1978) ("it is a clearly established principle
that interest is not a penalty but is intended only to compensate the government for delay in payment
of a tax"); Vick v. Phinney, 414 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[i]nterest, in tax cases as in others, is
merely compensatory; it is not a penalty"); United States v. Goldstein, 189 F.2d 752, 755 (1st Cir.
1951) ("[i]nterest is compensation for the use of money and is exacted because of a delay in payment
of the tax"); Owens v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 210, 213 (10th Cir.) ("[i]nterest... is intended to
compensate the government for the delay in payment of the tax"), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 704 (1942);
Jones v. United States, 371 F.2d 442, 450 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("interest is not a penalty but a charge for
the use of money, and the government unquestionably was deprived of the use of these taxes");
Time, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 680, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (interest is given to compensate
the government for a delay in payment of the tax).
142. Courts have acknowledged that the use of an interest rate to measure the amount of dam-
ages is sound. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
143. The courts have long established that the assessment of interest requires the existence of a
loan. For example, in Taylor v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 361 (1956), the tax court found that a debt
did not exist where the taxpayer used her own funds to set up commodity accounts for her relatives,
even though the taxpayer's relatives executed notes for the amounts in question. Therefore, money
which the taxpayer received from her relatives pursuant to a note was not includable in the tax-
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2. The Absence of Consent. Although deficiency interest arises
from a transaction in which there is a debt, it should not be treated as
interest for tax purposes because there is no consent to the existence of
that debt. 1" Like the recipient of the services in the second transaction
payer's income as interest. To reach that conclusion, the court looked to the intention of the parties
and found that the taxpayer did not expect to be repaid and that her relatives did not feel obligated
to repay her. Further repayment was explicitly contingent upon the success of the investments. See
Midkiff v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 724 (1991) (amounts added to a leasehold condemnation action
were not deductible interest because there was no enforceable obligation to pay the principal
amount); Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 785 (8th
Cir. 1982) (interest that accrued while an obligation was unenforceable was deductible because unen-
forceability was not within the taxpayer's control); Jordan v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 872 (1973),
aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1975) (amount added to the original purchase price of
stock in a recision offer was not interest because there was never a debt).
Similarly, although courts have held that where interest accrues on an unenforceable debt the
accrued interest is deductible once the loan becomes a legally enforceable obligation, those holdings
are grounded on the eventual enforceability of the debt. For example, in Investor's Ins. Agency v.
Commissioner, 677 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g 72 T.C. 1027'(1979), the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the amounts paid before an enforceable debt existed were interest. The
payment in question arose as a result of a guarantee that a joint venture would distribute profits by a
specified date. Under the terms of the agreement, if the joint venture did not distribute profits by
that date, the taxpayers were entitled to receive a return of their initial contribution to the venture
plus six percent simple annual interest from the date of the contribution. The taxpayers took the
position that the amount labeled interest was really a return of capital, and therefore could not be
interest for personal holding company tax purposes. Both the tax court and the court of appeals
disagreed. They found that the interest may have been calculated during a period when there was no
enforceable debt, but that once the debt became enforceable the amount due was interest regardless
of the manner in which it was measured. 677 F.2d at 1330-31. The courts thus analyzed the nature
of the amount separately from the manner of measurement.
In Investor's In& Agency the court of appeals found support in a line of cases in which corpora-
tions issued bonds on a date later than their stated dates and computed interest from the stated
dates. See, eg., Commissioner v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 333 U.S. 883 (1949), affg per curiam
174 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1949), aff'g 9 T.C. 1018 (1947); Commissioner v. Pressed Steel Car Co., Inc.,
152 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1945) (per curiam), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946); Commissioner v. Colum-
bia River Paper Mills, 126 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1942); Monon KR. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 345,
362-363 (1970); Ernst Kern Co., 1 T.C. 249 (1942); Oregon Pulp & Paper Co., 47 B.T.A. 772 (1942);
but see Commissioner v. Drovers Journal Pub. Co., 135 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1943) (court refused to
allow a deduction for interest attributable to a period before the issuance of the debt). In those cases,
the courts held that since the interest had accrued at the time of payment and since there was an
enforceable debt obligation in existence at that time, the calculation of the amount of interest from a
period prior to the issuance of the bond was immaterial. In effect, the manner of calculating the
interest affected only the rate of interest charged, not the characterization of the amount as interest.
Today, §§ 1272-1275 would generally preclude the deduction of the accrued amounts up front.
144. Although the taxpayer may dispute the existence of the debt, once the validity of the defi-
ciency is ascertained either judicially or by mutual consent, the debt exists. The disputed debt doc-
trine, which makes it clear that no debt can be said to exist until its validity is ascertained, is
consistent with this analysis. The disputed debt or contested liability doctrine was first enunciated
by the Board of Tax Appeals in N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939). In Sobel,
there was a dispute as to both liability for the debt and the amount of the debt. Id. at 1265. The tax
court in Colonial Say. Ass'n, 85 T.C. 855 (1985), aff'd, 854 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1988), interpreted
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discussed above,'45 the taxpayer merely inflicts an injury on the govern-
ment by failing to pay the amount when it becomes due. The taxpayer
has retained and used money due the government. The absence of gov-
ernmental consent to such retention and use forecloses the possibility of
characterizing the transaction as a loan.
Taxpayers do not have the government's consent to the late pay-
ment of taxes, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Neither the existence of
the deficiency interest provision, the taxpayer's ability to challenge a defi-
ciency in the tax court without first paying the amount of the defi-
ciency,'" nor the existence of the quick refund procedure' 47 suggests
that the obligation to pay the amount of tax imposed by the Code is a
matter of choice. The Code unequivocally imposes on every taxpayer an
absolute obligation to pay the amount due thereunder. 4  The existence
of both civil 49 and criminal 50 sanctions for failure to timely pay the
Sobel to require that there be a liquidated debt before the doctrine of discharge of indebtedness could
apply. Under the Sobel/Colonial Savings interpretation, the disputed debt or contested liability doc-
trine would prevent discharge of indebtedness income only if the amount of the debt, rather than its
enforceability, was in dispute. In Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'g Zarin v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1087 (1989), the Government argued for this interpretation of the doctrine,
but the Third Circuit rejected it. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. In Zarin, the Third Circuit articulated the
contested liability doctrine as follows:
Under the contested liability doctrine, if a taxpayer, in good faith, disputed the amount
of a debt, a subsequent settlement of the dispute would be treated as the amount of debt
cognizable for tax purposes. The excess of the original debt over the amount determined
to have been due is disregarded for both loss and debt and accounting purposes.
Id at 115. Thus, a taxpayer who disputes the existence of a debt will not have income from the
discharge of indebtedness when she comes to an agreement requiring the payment of less that the
amount originally claimed to have been owed. For tax purposes, a debt might as well not exist until
the amount of it is fixed by a court or by agreement between the parties.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
146. The tax court has deficiency jurisdiction only. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7442. Con.
gress' provision of a forum in which taxpayers can litigate a tax controversy without first paying the
deficiency asserted alleviates the hardship caused by having to pay asserted deficiency before being
able to contest its validity, but it can hardly be seen as an endorsement of the nonpayment of taxes
actually due. See generally Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991); Deborah A. Geier, The
Tax Court, Article III and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study
in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 985 (1991).
147. The quick refund procedure puts a loss corporation in the same position it would have been
in if it had incurred the loss in the year to which the Code permits a carryback. See supra notes 96-
97 and accompanying text. Its existence rests on the notion that the taxpayer is entitled to the
amount refunded. Its existence does not imply governmental consent to the use of the procedure as
a tool of corporate finance.
148. The Supreme Court's willingness to hold that a taxpayer's sincere belief that the payment
of taxes is unconstitutional precludes a finding that he willfully evaded the payment thereof does not
make the taxpayer's belief correct, as the Court has itself acknowledged. See Cheek v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
149. See I.R.C. § 6651 (imposing penalties for failure to file a tax return or pay tax); I.R.C.
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amount of taxes due shows that Congress did not intend to give taxpay-
ers the option of paying now or paying later, with interest.'51 The obliga-
tion is to pay when due. Failure to do so is not punished unless it results
from negligence or a purposeful act or omission, but it is not
condoned.1
5 2
The Code reflects a Congressional desire for a pay-as-you-go system.
It requires employers to withhold the amount of a taxpayer's expected
tax liability' and requires taxpayers generally to make estimated tax
payments. 54 Although the amount of the actual tax liability is deter-
mined on an annual basis and must necessarily await the conclusion of
the taxable year, the existence of the requirement for withholding by
payors and the payment of estimated taxes by payees shows that the gov-
§ 6652 (imposing penalties for failure to file information returns); I.R.C. § 6653 (imposing penalties
for failure to pay a stamp tax); I.R.C. §§ 6654-6655 (imposing penalties for failure to pay estimated
taxes due from individuals and corporations, respectively); I.R.C. § 6656 (imposing a penalty for
failure to deposit taxes). See also I.R.C. § 6652 (imposing accuracy related penalties); I.R.C. § 6663
(imposing a civil fraud penalty); I.R.C. §§ 6671-6713 (imposing various additional penalties and
providing rules for the application thereof).
150. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (crime to attempt to evade or defeat tax); I.R.C. § 7202 (crime to
fail to collect or pay over any tax); I.R.C. § 7203 (crime to willfully fail to fie a return, supply
information, or pay tax); see also I.R.C. §§ 7204-7232 (creating various other crimes involving the
nonpayment of taxes due or the filing or returns).
151. In Cheek, 111 S. Ct. 604, 613, the Court observed that it did "not believe that Congress
contemplated that such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties
imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by
Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their decisions."
152. Deficiency interest is not punishment, as courts have repeatedly held. See supra note 135.
That the government does not punish the late payment of taxes when that late payment is due to
disagreement over the interpretation or application of the law does not mean that it expects, con-
dones, or is unharmed by that late payment.
153. I.R.C. § 3402.
154. I.R.C. § 6654. Although no statutory provision explicitly requires the payment of esti-
mated tax, § 6654 has the effect of imposing such a requirement in many cases because failure to
make estimated tax payments in accordance with §§ 6654(c) and 6654(d) will result in the imposi-
tion of an estimated tax penalty, unless one of the exceptions in § 6654(e) applies. For a recent
discussion of the role of withholding and estimated taxes, see Abrams v. Brady, 59 U.S.L.W. (BNA)
2704 (1991).
Recent legislation that extended unemployment benefits and paid for the cost of doing so by
making the rules which require the payment of estimated taxes more restrictive demonstrates the
Congressional desire (perhaps even the fiscal imperative) to require the remittance of taxes as the
amounts on which they are levied are earned or otherwise received. See Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164, § 403, 105 Stat. 1049 (1991) (amending I.R.C.
§ 6654(d)). Indeed, the Congressional need or desire to require remittance of tax liability when
income is earned or received is so strong that making the corporate estimated tax provisions more
restrictive was considered the method of funding the extension of certain provisions which would
have expired in 1991 absent an extension. See Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227,
§ 201, 105 Stat. 1686 (1991) (amending I.R.C. § 6655(d)); see also Bennett Milton, Extenders Get
Six-Month Reprieve, 53 TAx NoTEs 998 (1991).
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ernment does not intend any extension of credit with regard to the taxes
actually due. 5' Recent changes to the estimated tax rules require the
remittance of a greater portion of the tax expected to be due, thus under-
scoring the absence of the government's consent to a taxpayer's retention
of tax due.
15 6
To treat deficiency interest as interest is to approve the notion that
deficiency interest is an amount paid in a taxpayer's exercise of its bor-
rowing power. Such treatment ratifies and encourages taxpayers' use of
the tax system as a tool of corporate finance, and makes a mockery out of
the obligation to pay taxes on a date certain. To do so is also unsound
because it treats as interest amounts which are paid under circumstances
which fail to correspond to the definition of that term in the commercial
world. 57 It treats as interest amounts which are more accurately charac-
terized as damages.
B. Treating Deficiency Interest as Damages
Because the deficiency interest rate is determined by statute, not by
the specific costs incurred by the government with respect to a particular
late payment of tax, deficiency interest is unlike damages received in liti-
gation. 5 ' Nevertheless, an amount need not be determined in the con-
text of litigation to be classified as damages.' 59 It need only be evident
that the amount is designed to compensate one party for injury caused by
another's wrong." ° Deficiency interest is designed to do just that.
1 61
Thus, it is more appropriate to treat deficiency interest as damages.
155. This does not suggest that the government is consenting to an extension of credit in those
situations in which no payment of estimated taxes is required. See, eg., I.R.C. § 66541)(2), which
generally exempts estates, grantor trusts and testamentary trusts from the requirement of making
estimated tax payments for two years after a decedent's death. Rather, those situations can be
viewed as concessions to administrative convenience.
156. See supra note 154.
157. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
158. Like liquidated damages, the amount of interest charged is not subject to litigation. While
there is certainly litigation over the imposition of interest, it is analogous to the litigation over the
question of whether a particular liquidated damages clause applies in a given case. Once a court
decides that the provision applies, the provision itself, not the court, sets the rate at which damages
will be paid. Similarly, in a tax case, a court may decide that no interest is due, but if interest is due,
§ 6621 provides the rate.
159. Liquidated damages are, by definition, damages, even though they are not determined in
the context of litigation. See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 990 (1964).
160. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 62. Courts and commentators have confused the compensa-
tory purpose of a payment with its character as interest. Thus, in Sharp v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
21 (1980), the court held that a payment required by a state statute was not interest because the
payment was intended to discourage frivolous appeals, not to compensate one party for another's use
of the money. While the court may have been correct as to the purpose of the state statute, the court
[Vol. 40
1992 DISTINGUISHING INTEREST FROM DAMAGES 415
1. The Tax Treatment of Damages. The tax law has long required
the tracing of damages to the item for which they substitute and has
taxed damages by reference to that item.162 Thus, the deductibility of
damages is determined by reference to the origin of the claim from which
they arise. Damages paid on claims incurred in carrying on a trade or
business or in the production or collection of income are therefore de-
ductible. 163 By contrast, when the damages relate to a nondeductible
capital expenditure, neither the courts nor the Service will allow a tax-
misanalyzed the issue by assuming that a compensatory purpose would have sufficed to render the
amount interest.
161. As in the classic case of a breached contract, the breaching party secures an undue benefit,
and the injured party loses an expected benefit; the breaching party here is the taxpayer, and the
injured party is the government. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 62, at 558.
Many courts that discuss the assessment of deficiency interest do so in the language of the con-
tract breach. They view the government as being "deprived of the use of money," Vick v. Phinney,
414 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1969), see also Jones v. United States, 371 F.2d 442 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and
they view the taxpayer as enjoying the undeserved benefit of the opportunity to use the money due
the government. See, e.g., United States v. Goldstein, 189 F.2d 752, 755 (Ist Cir. 1951) (taxpayer
had use of government's money); Owens v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 210, 213 (10th Cir. 1942) (tax-
payer seen to "enjoy the delay" when taxes are deficient); Ross v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 330,
333 (D. Mass. 1957) (taxpayer must pay because he had use of the government's money). See supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). In the Court's words, "the origin and
character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred ... is the controlling basic test
of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' and hence whether it is deductible or not." Id
The receipt of damages follows the same rule, so that damages are taxed in the same way the
amounts for which they compensate would have been taxed. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass,
348 U.S. 426 (1955).
Section 104 stands as a notable exception to this rule. This provision excludes from income
"damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness .. " Courts have been willing to
hold that amounts received as compensation for tort or tort-type injuries are excluded by this provi-
sion even when the amounts represent lost wages or similar, and otherwise taxable, amounts. See
Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1991); Pistillo v.
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990);
Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989); Thomason v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th
Cir. 1989); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294 (1986); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Catron v. United States, 582 F.
Supp. 8 (N.D. Okla. 1983); but see Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55. Because § 104 is a statutory
exception to the general rule and proceeds from particular policy considerations, its existence does
not affect the argument made here, which is premised upon the application of the general rule. For a
recent and thoughtful analysis of § 104, see Dodge, supra note 4.
163. See I.R.C. §§ 162 and 212. Courts have allowed a corporation to deduct damages paid in
settling a lawsuit where the corporation could have been found liable for negligent entrustment of a
company car. Kopp's Co. v. United States, 636 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1990). The Service even acknowl-
edges that a corporation can deduct punitive damages paid for breach of contract and fraud in
connection with the ordinary conduct of its business operations. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57.
Cf James E. Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 597
(1955) (damages paid by a corporation for the fraudulent business activities of its officers held
deductible).
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payer to deduct them. 6
The foregoing treatment is consistent with the general inclusion of
damages in income, 16' and with the characterization of damages received
by reference to the amounts they replace. 166 It also provides a logical
and theoretically clean way to determine the proper treatment of interest
on tax liabilities.167
2. Taxing Deficiency Interest Like Damages. If an amount paid as
interest on a tax liability might more properly be viewed as damages (de-
ficiency damages?), then it ought to be treated as such for federal income
tax purposes.1 68  Since damages are deductible only if the amount to
164. For example, in Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970), the
court held that a corporation could not deduct damages paid to settle litigation which sought specific
performance of an alleged contract. To reach that conclusion the court applied the origin of the
claim doctrine. Since the litigation involved a claim on the corporation's assets, the court agreed
with the Service and made the corporation capitalize the payments. Similarly, in Arthur H.
Dugrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931 (1972), the tax court denied the deductibility of
amounts paid to settle a claim based on fraudulent concealment. Since the litigation involved the
sale of the corporation's assets, the court held that the payments were a nondeductible capital
expenditure.
165. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
166. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941) (the amount received in settlement of a
claim was "essentially a substitute for rental payments which [§ 61] expressly characterizes as gross
income, [such that] it must be regarded as ordinary income"); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113-14 (Ist Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) ("The test is not
whether the action was one in tort or contract but rather the question to be asked is 'In lieu of what
were the damages awarded'... Where the suit is not to recover lost profits but is for injury to good
will, the recovery represents a return of capital and, with certain limitations... is not taxable."). Cf
Greene v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 190 (1983) (treble damages held taxable as ordinary
income even though taxpayer contended that they were awarded for loss of goodwill when court
concluded that treble damages are punitive and not compensatory). The Service agrees; see Rev.
Proc. 67-33, 1967-2 C.B. 659 (acknowledging that settlements are taxed like damage awards and,
like damage awards, are taxed by reference to the nature of the amounts for which they substitute).
167. The conclusion that deficiency interest is damages would not require repeal of provisions
like § 453A(c), which requires taxpayers to pay interest on the deferred tax liability attributable to
certain installment obligations. Section 453A is an anti-abuse provision. It was designed to curtail
the benefits of installment reporting. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1037, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988), re-
printed in [1988] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) % 2887. If Congress believes that by permitting
certain taxpayers to report gain on the installment basis it is making a loan to those taxpayers, then
requiring the taxpayers to pay a charge for the money loaned is fair. Treating that charge as interest,
as § 453A(c)(5) specifically provides, is also fair. The crucial inquiry is whether Congress wants to
put the government in the position of a lender. If it deliberately decides to do so, as it apparently has
in connection with installment reporting, the tax treatment should be consistent with that decision.
When Congress has not deliberately decided to put the government in the position of lender, the
treatment of the charge should not proceed as if it had.
168. Taxation ought to follow the economic substance of transactions unless policy considera-
tions suggest otherwise. In this case, they do not. Denying deductibility to deficiency interest will
not unfairly discriminate against taxpayers who choose not to borrow and instead pay the deficiency,
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which they relate is deductible, under the proposed analysis deficiency
interest would clearly be deductible only if federal income taxes were
deductible. 16 9 Because federal income taxes are not deductible, defi-
because those taxpayers are in a economically different position and have entered into an economi-
cally different transaction than those subject to an outstanding deficiency. See infra Part IV. By
contrast, maintaining the deductibility of deficiency interest will continue to allow certain taxpayers
to use the government as an involuntary lender and will encourage the filing of returns that take
aggressive return positions. That is unsound tax policy. A system already struggling with an in-
creasing compliance gap and a declining audit rate (see Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Changing Face of
Tax Enforcement, 1978-1988, 43 TAX LAW. 893 (1990)) can ill afford to encourage actions which
will only exacerbate those problems.
169. As the Service has put it, damages or "payments made in settlement of lawsuits are deduct-
ible if the acts which gave rise to the litigation were performed in the ordinary conduct of...
business." Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-1 C.B. 57 (citing Rev. Rul. 78-210, 1978-1 C.B. 39) (amounts
paid for malpractice judgments deductible as a business expense); see Kornhauser v. United States,
276 U.S. 145, T.D. 4222, 7-2 C.B. 267 (1928) (attorney's fees arising from a defense in a suit brought
by a partner deductible as business expense); Mulgrew Blacktop, Inc. v. United States, 311 F. Supp.
570 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (corporation's payment of settlement arising from officer's accident in operat-
ing a corporate vehicle deductible as a business expense); Cochrane v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 202
(1931) (payment for loss to client due to taxpayer's error deductible as a business expense), acq., 10-2
C.B. 14 (1931); Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 C.B. 22 (premiums paid by bank to cover liability for
wrongful acts of officers deductible as business expenses). Thus, damages that result from actions
taken in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's business are deductible. See, eg., United States Freight
Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (down payment forfeited as liquidated damages
deductible as a business expense); Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956)
(compromise payments in settlement of fraud charge deductible as business expenses), rev'g 24 T.C.
597 (1955); Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935) (judgment due to fraudulent activi-
ties deductible as a business expense); Ostrom v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 789 (1984) (damages paid to
client due to fraudulent statements in a stock purchase deductible as business expense); Mack v.
United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9228 (D. Nev. 1982) (trustee allowed to deduct payment
to beneficiary for loss on stock purchase as a business expense); Milner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9661 (S.D. Miss.) (compensatory damages paid to the United
States deductible as a business expense); Dancer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1103 (1980) (payment
arising out of car accident that occurred while traveling on business deductible as a business ex-
pense); DeVito v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 152 (1977) (value of property transferred in
settlement of litigation for breach of employment contract deductible as a business expense); Colo-
nial Eng'g Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476 (1963) (settlement ofjudgment for damages
for causing loss of business profits deductible as business expense).
By contrast, courts have refused to allow a deduction for damages resulting from activities not
related to the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business. See, eg., Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 342 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965) (payment of damages attributable to a capital expendi-
ture not deductible as a business expense); Portland Gasoline Co. v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 538
(5th Cir. 1950) (compromise payment made in connection with a reorganization not deductible be-
cause part of the capital investment); Stern v. Carey, 119 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (amount
paid in satisfaction of judgment for personal injuries resulting from automobile accident are not
deductible as a casualty loss); Nelson v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1423 (1971) (payment to
relieve seller of future liability held to be capital in nature and not deductible); Mulholland v. Com-
missioner, 16 B.T.A. 1331 (1929) (damages for personal injuries caused by taxpayer's automobile,
where injuries were caused on a pleasure trip, do not come within the purview of property losses
which may be deducted under the casualty loss provision).
418 BUFFALO LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 40
ciency interest should not be deductible either. 170
More is at stake than the determination of the tax rate.17' Defi-
170. The nonpayment of federal taxes gives rise to deficiency payments. These payments, how-
ever, do not proceed exclusively from the nature of trade or business conduct. Although the Internal
Revenue Code taxes income irrespective of its source (see I.R.C. § 61), it does not allow a federal
business income tax deduction. See infra note 171 for a discussion of the effect of the absence of a
federal income tax deduction. Since tax obligation is what gives rise to deficiency liability, and tax
obligation is not considered a business obligation for purposes of current tax deductibility, damages
for neglecting that obligation should also be treated as nonbusiness and nondeductible, unless such
nondeductibility would be contrary to sound public or tax policy. It is not. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 172-88.
Cases such as Standing v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 789 (1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958),
where the tax court held that both deficiency interest and the expenses of litigating a tax controversy
were deductible from gross income in adjusted gross income calculations, do not address the issues
raised here because in those cases the court assumed deficiency interest was true interest. The court
had only to decide whether the interest was related to the taxpayer's business or personal activity.
Cases such as Reise v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 571, aff'd, 299 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1962), where the
court held that state income taxes and interest on both federal and state income taxes were attributa-
ble to a taxpayer's trade or business and therefore allowable as a deduction when computing net
operating loss, are also inapposite because those cases treated deficiency interest as true interest and
not as part of the tax. Thus, although the Service eventually agreed with the courts that deficiency
interest on taxes due on business income ought to be treated as a business expense (Rev. Rul. 70-40,
1970-1 C.B. 50 (superseding Rev. Rul. 58-142, 1958-1 C.B. 147)) and allowed individual taxpayers
to deduct them in determining the amount of a net operating loss under a system in which all
interest is deductible, that agreement does not end the debate. Rev. Rul. 70-40, 1970-1 C.B. 50 and
the cases it cited, assumed that deficiency interest was true interest. Neither that ruling nor the
cases it cited answer the question of whether deficiency interest ought to be deductible if viewed as
damages directly related to the obligation to pay the tax. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-26-014 (June 28,
1991) (fees for tax advice and tax preparation held deductible from adjusted gross income, not from
gross income, because "only remotely connected" to the taxpayer's business).
171. While it is undoubtedly true that one could craft a tax system in which the tax itself was a
deductible amount (that is, a tax-exclusive system) which would impose tax at an effective rate com-
parable to that imposed under the present (tax-inclusive) system, the general equivalence between
such systems does not require that deficiency interest be deductible. For a thorough discussion of
the tax-inclusive/tax-exclusive issue, see Harry L. Gutman, Reforming the Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1983); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to
Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983).
Although deficiency interest can easily be traced to the payment of tax, deficiency interest,
whether it is really interest or damages, is different from the underlying tax in at least one very
important respect. Unlike the tax with respect to which it accrues, deficiency interest arises due to a
voluntary act or omission of the taxpayer. A taxpayer who incurs a tax liability has no choice about
the payment of the tax liability, but she does have a choice with respect to the accrual of deficiency
interest. Even if the theory on vhich the deficiency is assessed is so far fetched that the taxpayer
could never have divined it on her own, once the deficiency is assessed the taxpayer can choose to
pay it and stop the accrual of deficiency interest.
The tax system itself can be structured on either a tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive basis because the
liability for the tax accrues to all similarly situated taxpayers in the same way. That assumption
allows a mathematician to take a tax inclusive rate and convert it into an equivalent tax exclusive
rate. When taxpayers can exercise the power of choice to place themselves in economically dissimi-
lar positions notwithstanding that they have liability for the same amount of tax, mathematics alone
cannot put them in the same position again unless it acquires the benefit of hindsight. (Even
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ciency interest lacks a deductible origin because in general, only costs of
doing business are deductible and federal income taxes are not consid-
ered such a cost, even for corporations. 72 Not all costs incurred by cor-
porations are considered costs of doing business, 73 and not all are
deductible. 4
Congress has implicitly acknowledged that not all activities in which
a corporation engages are motivated by the exigencies of business.' 7
Even a corporation's very existence may be deemed motivated by non-
business considerations. 176 Many so-called anti-abuse provisions 7 7 were
necessary because Congress recognized that the actions of corporations
are not always motivated by business objectives. The adoption of such
provisions suggests that Congress does not accept the proposition that
since a corporation is organized for the purpose of engaging in a business,
everything that it does must necessarily be connected to that business.'
7
1
probability theory would be inadequate because the most it could hope to do is predict an outcome,
but it could not ensure fair treatment in all cases.) The denial of the deduction more accurately
reflects the difference in positions and will operate in harmony with the taxpayer's choice.
172. Some of the points made here also suggest a more thorough examination of the proper
treatment of other costs of complying with the federal income tax laws, both for individuals and for
corporations. A detailed examination of the proper treatment of the costs of contesting a tax liabil-
ity, including the cost of paying interest on any underpayment, must wait for another day. For now
it suffices to note that even if such other costs are currently deductible, that does not mean that they
should continue to be so.
173. See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1374, *11 n.5, *19 nn.7-8 (Feb. 26,
1992) (endorsing decisions which recognized that not all costs incurred by corporations are costs of
doing business).
174. This discussion will focus on treatment of deficiency interest incurred by corporations be-
cause deficiency interest paid or incurred by individuals is not deductible under current law. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i) (1987). While some commentators disagree with this position both
in general, and to the extent that it makes nondeductible deficiency interest paid or incurred in
connection with an individual's conduct of a trade or business, see infra note 78, focusing the discus-
sion on corporate deficiency interest suffices for purposes of illustrating the effect of the proposed
analysis.
175. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(k) (denying a deduction for expenses incurred in connection with a
redemption); I.R.C. § 274 (denying a deduction for certain expenses even though the expense is
incurred by a taxpayer, including a corporation, in connection with its business); I.R.C. § 280G
(denying a deduction for golden parachute payments made by a corporation); and I.R.C. § 280F
(limiting depreciation deductions with respect to luxury automobiles and other listed property).
176. See, e.g., I.11.C. §§ 269, 269A and cases like Fogelsong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982), which would not have arisen if it were axiomatic that a corporation exists to carry on a
business, and that all of its activities are dedicated to that end. See also I.R.C. § 482.
177. See, eg., I.R.C. § 541 (personal holding company tax); I.R.C. § 531 (accumulated earn-
ings tax); I.R.C. § 341 (collapsible corporations). See also I.R.C. §§ I 1(b)(2), 280H, 444 (provisions
applying to personal service corporations).
178. The need to determine whether a particular activity in which a corporation engages is
related to the conduct of its trade or business is not limited to the prevention of abuse. While some
of the provisions mentioned above were directed at arguably abusive situations, others represent
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No corporation is engaged in the business of paying federal income
taxes. While business activities may generate tax liability, the payment of
that liability is not a trade or business. As Mrs. Gregory learned over
half a century ago, 179 the reduction of federal income tax liability is not
part of a corporation's business. As Mr. Davis learned more recently,
even a corporation's business needs do not determine the federal income
tax consequences of particular transactions.180 Courts have been
steadfast in their refusal to give tax effect to transactions entered into
solely to reduce federal income tax liability, even though tax liability di-
rectly affects a corporation's bottom line." 1 Instead, courts have re-
quired that taxpayers adduce the existence of a nontax purpose for a
transaction before giving the transaction its intended tax effect.
182
The payment of deficiency interest is no more closely connected to
the conduct of a taxpayer's business than are the actions taken to effect a
Congressional recognition that some of the activities in which a corporation engages have both busi-
ness and nonbusiness motives, and it is often difficult to distinguish between the two. See, eg.,
I.R.C. § 274(n) (limiting, but not denying, the deduction for business meals).
179. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (transaction designed solely to reduce tax liabil-
ity lacked a business purpose and was not given effect for federal income tax purposes). For a
discussion of some of the considerable commentary on Gregory, see infra note 181.
180. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) (a redemption was treated as a dividend even
though the taxpayer had entered into the transaction to fulfill the corporation's business needs).
181. Gregory, 293 U.S. 465; Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), and their progeny,
one of the most recent of which is Hutchinson v. United States, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 150,573 (D. Or.
1990). See Karen N. Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Ap-
proach to Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REv. 659, 663 n.13 (1989) (noting that "[a] Lexis
search in 1988 revealed over 1100 cases citing Gregory"). Much scholarly thought has been devoted
to analyzing courts' reaction to tax motivated transactions. See Saul I. Levemore, Recharacteriza-
tions and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. PA. L. Rav. 1019 (1988); Alan Gunn,
Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733 (1978); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution
to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968); Fuller, supra note 77; Ralph S. Rice, Judicial
Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1953).
Even if one disagrees with the judicial treatment of tax motivated transactions, what is important
is simply that the existence of those cases shows that courts have been unwilling to accept the general
proposition that everything that a corporation does is related to its business. In Esmark, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, (7th Cir. unpublished opinion, Sept. 15, 1989), which
allowed a taxpayer to obtain the desired tax result even though the court acknowledged that the
transaction was structured in a particular form in order to achieve that result, the court took pains to
find other economic consequences to the actions which the taxpayer had taken.
182. This has come to be referred to as the business purpose doctrine. For an excellent discus-
sion of the business purpose doctrine, see BrrrKER & EusTicE, supra note 80, at 14.51, and the
many articles cited therein. Although the doctrine, in at least one of its formulations, has come
under severe criticism recently, (see Moore, supra note 181), and taxpayers have even been able to
withstand its assertion (see Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, (7th Cir. un-
published opinion, Sept. 15, 1989)), it cannot yet be pronounced dead. Indeed, taxpayers would like
to be able to articulate it on their own behalf. Robert T. Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer's
Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAx LAw. 137 (1990).
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transaction whose sole objective is the reduction of a taxpayer's federal
income tax liability. Admittedly, the payment of deficiency interest af-
fects a business's bottom line, and it is the business activity which gener-
ates the tax liability in question. But filing a federal income tax return
and taking positions thereon is no more related to a corporate taxpayer's
business than engaging in a transaction designed exclusively to reduce
the tax liability reflected on the return, or paying the tax itself. The test
should be something more than "but for."
Not all business-related disbursements made by a corporation are
deductible.18 3 Federal income taxes are not, dividends are not, and
neither are the costs of acquiring certain nondepreciable assets, such as
goodwill. 84 Not even all amounts denominated interest are deducti-
ble."' An assertion that corporate deficiency interest ought to be fully
deductible because the identity of the obligor conclusively establishes its
link to a business activity is therefore incorrect. 86 The deductibility of
the expense ought to be determined by the nature of the underlying cause
of the expense.
1 7
The recharacterization of deficiency interest as damages will allow
Congress (or perhaps the courts 88) to determine the tax treatment of the
amount by reference to the substance of the economic transaction it ef-
183. The Supreme Court has held that even professional fees incurred by a corporation may not
be deductible. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1374, at *16 (Feb. 26, 1992).
184. On July 25, 1991, Rep. Rostenkowski introduced H.R. 3035, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REc. H5908-02 (1991), which would dramatically change the tax law by permitting taxpay-
ers to amortize goodwill and certain other acquired intangibles ratably over a 14 year period. The
bill would reverse the decisions in cases like Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. No. 16
(August 12, 1991) and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991),
petition for cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1992) (No. 91-1135), where the courts held
that the value of the assembled workforce and paid subscriber lists, respectively, were assets indistin-
guishable from goodwill and were therefore nonamortizable. For a good analysis of some of the
implications of the bill, see Ronald A. Pearlman, The Amortization of Acquired Intangible Asset A
Subject Whose Time May Have Come, TAX NoTEs, Aug. 26, 1991, at 1083. For additional commen-
tary, see Lee A. Sheppard, Amortization of Intangible= Something Out of Nothing, TAX NoTEs, Aug.
26, 1991, at 984; Tim Gray, 'Winners and Losers' in Rosty's Intangibles Bill, TAX NoTEs, Aug. 26,
1991, at 982.
185. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(e)(5), 163(f), 163(j), 279.
186. See ABA Section of Taxation Comments and William H. Paul letter, supra note 82.
187. The foregoing analysis might lead to the conclusion that the legal, accounting and other
expenses incurred by a business in ascertaining and contesting its tax liability should also be nonde-
ductible under § 162. And perhaps they should be. After all, not all legal, accounting and similar
expenses incurred by a corporation are deductible. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 1374 (Feb. 26, 1992). In any event, if Congress wishes to retain the deductibility of such
expenses it can do so by adding a provision like § 212(b)(3) to § 162.
188. Although it would be easiest for Congress to address this issue by legislation, the term
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fects, and to consider the policies which a particular treatment would
advance. Unmasking deficiency interest as damages is the first step in
that long overdue process.
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTESTING WHILE OWING AND
BORROWING TO CONTEST.
Treating deficiency interest as damages might also provide a concep-
tually sound rationale for distinguishing between those who contest a de-
ficiency and incur a charge, and those who borrow money from a third
party lender and use the proceeds to pay a deficiency while continuing to
contest it. Under a system that treats deficiency interest as damages, a
corporation that chose to contest a deficiency and then lost or settled the
contest would owe deficiency interest which it could not deduct. If in-
stead of contesting an unpaid deficiency, the corporation borrowed from
a third party, used the proceeds to pay the amount of the deficiency, and
then contested the assessment by filing claim for refund, the interest due
the third party would be deductible under current law. 89 This apparent
disparity in treatment has been hailed as a reason to reject the proposal
to make deficiency interest nondeductible. 190
The disparity in treatment is troublesome only if the two transac-
tions are economically similar, and the disparity exists only if the current
treatment of interest expense is correct. In this case, the two transactions
are not similar and the differences between them justify the difference in
the way in which the federal income tax system treats them. In addition,
as Part V will demonstrate, the current treatment of interest expense is
not necessarily correct.
The two transactions are not similar because a corporation that
chooses not to pay the deficiency is in a very different position from a
corporation that borrows from a third party to pay the deficiency. True,
both corporations incur debts, but the debts arise from fundamentally
different transactions and therefore merit different treatment.
The corporation that does not pay the deficiency may ultimately be
"interest" has been traditionally defined by judicial opinion, not legislation. See supra notes 99, 109-
10.
189. The addition of § 6621(c), the hot interest provision, creates a disparity in some situations
even under current law. In cases where the increased interest rate applies, taxpayers might have
different economic consequences depending on whether they borrow to pay the deficiency or contest
the deficiency and then become liable for hot interest in addition to regular deficiency interest. In-
deed, that is one of the reasons the provision has received such vehement opposition. See supra note
85.
190. See supra note 82.
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found to owe money, but it has not borrowed it. The government has not
consented to the existence of a debt. Indeed, the government's position is
the antithesis of consent - when the government asserts a deficiency it is
taking the position that the corporation has retained money which
should have been paid to the government, and the time for payment is
past due. If the deficiency is sustained, the corporation will pay the gov-
ernment an amount in addition to the tax due which is determined with-
out regard to the corporation's financial position or the length of time
during which it used the funds. In general, it will also be required to pay
the entire amount all at once. But if the deficiency is not sustained, it
will not pay any amount at all. It will be as if no debt had ever existed. 191
The corporation that borrows from a third party and uses the pro-
ceeds to satisfy the government's claim also owes a debt. However, un-
like the delinquent taxpayer, the debt it owes is the product of a
consensual transaction. The corporation pays interest on a prescribed
schedule. Unlike the government, the commercial lender voluntarily for-
bears collection. In addition, the corporation retains the obligation to
pay back the amount of the loan, plus interest, regardless of what hap-
pens to the deficiency. The infusion of cash it has received is only tempo-
rary and will have to be repaid in all events. The argument that a
taxpayer who borrows and pays the deficiency is in the same economic
position as one who has to pay the deficiency, plus interest, is therefore
flawed.
The foregoing comparison helps to demonstrate why many of the
arguments against changing the deductibility of corporate deficiency in-
terest are unpersuasive. 192 Although these arguments are replete with
tables and charts which purport to illustrate the economic effect of any
change in the law,193 the arguments omit an essential point - neither the
deficiency nor the deficiency interest is due until a final determination is
made. 94 Unlike those who borrow from a commercial lender, a tax-
payer who has failed to pay a deficiency need make no payments of either
principal or interest while the determination of ultimate liability is
pending.
Those who focus on the ability to borrow from third party lenders' 95
191. See supra note 144.
192. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 85, at 1417; Report on Section 6621(c), supra note 85. See also
supra note 82.
193. See sources cited supra notes 82-85.
194. See supra note 85.
195. See sources cited supra note 85.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
overlook the twin advantages of using funds in a manner which does not
cause a cash drain and using funds that may never have to be paid to the
claimant. The reality is that the need to pay commercial interest over the
life of a loan at rates that will probably vary depending on the length of
that life and the creditworthiness of the borrower will make commercial
interest significantly different and less attractive than contesting the defi-
ciency without payment.'96
If deficiency interest were not deductible to corporations while most
commercial interest continued to be, there would be a difference in the
tax treatment of those who contest a deficiency first and pay later, and
those who borrow from a third party to pay the deficiency prior to con-
testing it. Those who take the latter position would find the after-tax
cost of the contest lower because of the deductibility of the interest on the
commercial loan.' 97 The need to take into account the deductibility of
interest on the amount of the deficiency ultimately found to exist would
alter the way in which taxpayers manage tax controversies. 198
Changes in the management of tax controversies could even be salu-
tary. Arguments that a change in the deductibility of deficiency interest
will result in decreased access to the tax court and the necessity to con-
sider the making of partial payments show the extent to which taxpayers
have used the tax system as a tool of corporate finance. 199 The tax court
will remain attractive to a taxpayer contesting a deficiency in good faith
because a victory results in the taxpayer's having kept its money without
any disruption to its cash flow for the payment of interest. The tax court
will continue to fulfill its objective of providing a forum in which a tax-
payer can litigate a tax controversy without parting with any cash.2"
196. Part of the reason for this is that the deficiency interest rate fails to take into account what
Professors Bankman and Klein call the term structure of interest. See Bankman & Klein, supra note
126.
197. The need to borrow commercially to ensure the deductibility of the interest would lead to
particularly anomalous results in situations where the taxpayer ultimately prevailed. In those situa-
tions the taxpayer would have incurred the cost of borrowing money which ultimately was found not
to be due. Although the government would return the money paid, with interest, the rate paid by
the government would probably differ from that paid by the taxpayer to the commercial lender, as
would the timing of the inclusion and deduction. The transactions would only occasionally be a
wash. In many cases, the differences would favor the taxpayer.
198. See generally Garbis & Fisher, supra note 47; Stark, supra note 85. Much of the invective
against the initial proposal to make deficiency interest nondeductible and the enactment of the hot
interest provision amounts to dismay over a change in what had heretofore been considered a funda-
mental rule of the game. But the change proposed in this Article should not be rejected simply
because it will result in change.
199. See supra notes 82-85.
200. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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Nothing requires that the tax court be the cheapest forum in which a
taxpayer with a strong credit rating and access to the financial markets
can litigate a tax controversy.3°
Moreover, if the tax treatment of deficiency interest has been a driv-
ing force behind the management of tax controversies, it is time to level
the playing field.20 2 Leveling the playing field does not mean making
deficiency interest low and deductible to everybody. Such a system
would only encourage the use of the government as an involuntary finan-
cier. The vehemence of the outcries over the initial proposal to deny the
deductibility of corporate deficiency interest and over the adoption of the
hot interest provision suggests how important such use has become. 203
Leveling the playing field means removing the favorable treatment
afforded certain classes of taxpayers. It means providing a forum in
which all taxpayers can litigate a tax controversy without first parting
with the cash assessed. It does not mean that those who choose to incur
an independent liability to a third party commercial lender and to suffer
the attendant cash flow drain should be treated in the same manner as
those who decline to make such a choice. Although both transactions
succeed in giving the taxpayer the use of a certain principal amount, one
is not the economic equivalent of the other.
The differences between the commercial loan transaction and the
nonpayment of a deficiency might justify a difference in tax treatment of
the amount labeled interest even if deficiency interest were true interest.
If deficiency interest were true interest, it might still be appropriate to
make it nondeductible because it relates to a nonbusiness activity.2°4
However, under current law, the nature of the activity which the bor-
201. It is interesting to note that practicing lawyers, who are decrying the projected demise of
the tax court if deficiency jurisdiction is made less attractive because of changes in the tax treatment
of deficiency interest, (at least partially on the grounds that it will shift more tax controversies into
courts of general, rather than specialized, jurisdiction (see supra notes 82-85)) have as a group also
attacked proposals to create a specialized court of tax appeals, on the ground that courts of general
jurisdiction serve a needed and salutary function in the development of the tax law. See FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (1989);
William D. Popkin, Why a Court of Tax Appeals Is So Elusive, 47 TAX NOTES 1101 (1990) (synopsis
of the debate on this issue and an excellent bibliography of recent commentary).
202. See Arthur W. Andrews, The Use of the Injunction as a Remedy for an Invalid Federal Tax
Assessment, 40 TAx L. REv. 653 (1984-1985); Garbis & Fisher, supra note 47; Patrick B. Mathis,
Advanced Payments of Proposed Deficiencies Useful in Today's High Interest Rate Climate, 56 J.
TAX'N 366 (1982); Stark, supra note 85, at 1417; Michael Weintraub & Phillip Starr, Tax Planning
for Proposed and Outstanding Federal Tax Deficiencies, 11 TAX SEC. NEws 1 (1985).
203. See supra notes 85-86.
204. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
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rowed funds facilitate does not matter, as all corporate interest is gener-
ally deductible.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons the proposal to deny the deduc-
tion for deficiency interest generated such a maelstrom of controversy:205
it suggests an expansion of the concept of tracing (which makes the de-
ductibility of an amount dependent on the use to which it is put) into
heretofore sacred ground. If deficiency interest were treated as damages,
it would be nondeductible regardless of the identity of the payor because
the deductibility of damages depends on the origin of the underlying
claim.20 6 Under current law, the deductibility of interest, at least for cor-
porations, does not generally depend on the origin of the underlying
claim.2°7 A tax system that allowed a deduction for virtually all corpo-
rate interest expense but denied a deduction for deficiency interest (be-
cause it characterized deficiency interest as damages) would create an
incentive to borrow from commercial lenders to cover the cost of the
deficiency. Although the disparate treatment of those who incur defi-
ciency interest and those who borrow to satisfy the deficiency under such
a system could be supported academically,20 8 it might nevertheless pro-
duce inequity by favoring well advised and financially strong enterprises.
This potential inequity could be resolved by reformulating the de-
duction for corporate interest expense. Although the primary aim of this
Article has been to suggest an alternative perspective on the nature of
amounts which the law has traditionally classified as interest, this new
perspective can advance our thinking about the appropriate federal in-
come tax treatment of corporate interest expense. The next part of this
Article seeks to begin that process by setting forth a modest proposal for
reformulating the federal income tax treatment of corporate interest ex-
pense. Although the proposal is not developed fully here, the outline
presented may serve as a catalyst for further discussion and debate.
V. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE INTEREST EXPENSE
For many years the general rule was that if an amount was interest,
it was deductible.20 9 After the Supreme Court defined interest as an
205. See supra note 82.
206. See supra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 79.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 190-203.
209. See, eg., I.R.C. § 163 (1984). See also Charles 0. Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness
Interest: An Exercise in Planned Confusion, 41 TAx LAW. 803 (1988). Commentators have ques-
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amount paid "for the use or forbearance of money" in Deputy v. Du-
pont,210 the only question remaining was whether a given amount satis-
fied that definition. In only two situations of general application did
compliance with that definition fail to suffice in establishing deductibil-
ity.211 The first was where the borrowed funds allowed a taxpayer to
purchase or carry tax exempt securities2 12 and the second was where the
borrowed funds were used in connection with an individual taxpayer's
investments.213 In those two situations the use of the loan proceeds was
important in determining the deductibility of the interest thereon. Trac-
ing deductibility to use was the exception, not the rule.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "'86 Act"),2 14 eliminated that
relatively simple regime.215 By adding sections 163(h) 216 and 469,217 the
tioned the policy basis for the corporate interest deduction, but much of the analysis has focused on
the treatment of interest paid on long term, unsecured corporate borrowings (corporate securities),
and has been prompted by the differing treatment of interest paid on debt and dividends paid on
equity. See, e-g., Warren, supra note 116. Much attention has also been devoted to an examination
of transactions in which an interest element is present but not treated as such for tax purposes. See,
e.g., Asimow, supra note 1; Halperin, supra note 8.
210. 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). See also Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 561
(1932).
211. The Code denies a deduction for interest in certain situations which present an opportunity
for abuse. Thus, § 267(a)(2) denies an interest deduction to a payor until the related payee includes
the interest in income and § 461(h) denies the payor a deduction until economic performance has
occurred, that is, until the lender has forgone the use of the funds. See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 875 (1984). See also § 246A, which restricts the dividends received deduction with
respect to dividends distributed on debt-financed portfolio stock. In addition, § 465, which limits
deductions to the extent the payor is at risk, could operate to disallow a deduction for interest. Until
its repeal in 1986, § 189 disallowed the deduction for construction period interest. Section 263A
now requires the capitalization of interest incurred to acquire certain property. See Cheryl D. Block,
The Trouble With Interest: Reflections On Interest Deductions After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 40
FLA. L. REv. 689 (1988).
212. See I.R.C. § 265.
213. See I.R.C. § 163(d). For a history of the introduction of I.R.C. §§ 265 and 163(d), see
Taggart, supra note 78, at 204-05.
214. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
215. See Block, supra note 211; Taggart, supra note 78; Galvin, supra note 209; Curtis J. Berger,
Simple Interest and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1981).
216. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085. This provision denies individuals any
deduction for what it defines as "personal interest." I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). The provision has the effect
of allowing individuals to deduct only interest incurred in carrying on a trade or business, interest
incurred with respect to property held for investment or profit, certain interest attributable to passive
activities, certain interest paid or incurred in connection with an extension of the time for payment
of estate taxes, and "qualified residence interest," which is generally defined to include only interest
on a first or second mortgage, with certain limitations. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2).
217. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100 Stat. 2085. Section 469 limits an individual's ability to
deduct amounts attributable to what the provision defines as "passive activities." I.R.C. § 469(a).
In general, the provision permits the deduction of amounts attributable to the conduct of such activi-
ties only against income generated by those activities.
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'86 Act expanded the tracing concept pioneered in sections 265 and
163(d) so much that tracing has now become the rule with respect to
individuals. In addition, the '86 Act reversed the nature of the operation
of tracing. Rather than operating only to deny an otherwise allowable
deduction, tracing is now a necessary precondition to the allowance of
the deduction.
Tracing is increasingly important in the case of corporations as well.
The much maligned uniform capitalization rules of section 263A show a
Congressional desire to treat all acquisition costs consistently, and to
treat interest as a cost of acquisition.218 Congress has evidently decided
to marry the deductibility of interest to the use of the borrowed funds for
both corporations and individuals.2 19 By marrying deductibility to use,
Congress has eliminated the fungibility of money. The questions now are
whether that elimination is correct, and, if it is, whether it should apply
to corporations to the same extent as it applies to individuals.
A. The Marriage of Deductibility to Use Is Sound Tax Policy
A normative income tax system should distinguish between those
expenditures that are discretionary and those that are necessary for the
production of income.220 In general, the federal income tax system
218. See I.R.C. § 263A(). See also John W. Kindt, The New Assault on Freedom of Thought:
Section 263A of the InternalRevenue Code, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 137 (1988); B. Anthony Billings &
John Messer, How to Cope With the Uniform Capitalization Rules, 15 J. CORP. TAX'N 324 (1989).
The recently proposed regulations dealing with the allocation of interest expense between foreign
and domestic sources evidence the growth of tracing. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-10(e), 56 Fed.
Reg. 10397 (1991); see also I.R.C. § 864(e). The concept has even been applied to charitable contri-
butions, which proposed regulations would also require taxpayers to allocate between foreign and
domestic source income. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8, 56 Fed. Reg. 10395 (1991). That the
expansion of the concept has failed to draw cheers from practitioners is no indictment of its theoreti-
cal soundness. See Marianne Burge & Richard M. Hammer, Price Waterhouse Disagrees With Net-
ting Rule for Interest Allocation, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 141-24, July 3, 1991; Kathleen Matthews,
Witnesses Sing Same Old Song at IRS Hearing of CFC Netting Rules, 91 TAx NOTES TODAY 134-1,
June 24, 1991; Daniel R. Mitchell, Amoco Consolidates Comments on Domestic Source Regulations,
91 TAX NOTEs TODAY 134-53, June 24, 1991; Donald H. Skadden, AICPA Outlines Comments on
Interest Allocation Reg&, 91 TAX NOTEs TODAY 132-54, June 20, 1991; Peter G. Powers, Smithso-
nian Pushes for U.S. Source Income Presumption, 91 TAX NoTEs TODAY 138-44, June 28, 1991; all
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. See also Robert Feinschreiber, Allocation and Ap-
portionment of Interest, 3 INT'L TAx J. 538 (1977).
219. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 78, at 262-70.
220. As Professor Surrey has eloquently stated:
In terms of the income tax, the normative structure involves the determination of the
base of the tax (net income); the accounting period; the taxable unit; and the rate sched-
ule.... In the United States ... the normative concept of net income is the general
economic definition of income under the "Haig-Simons" approach, i.e. increase in net
economic wealth between two points of time plus consumption during that period.
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makes that distinction, except where it specifically seeks to influence
behavior through the provision of tax incentives. Determining whether
interest ought to be deductible under such a system requires a determina-
tion of whether the borrowing was discretionary or necessary. 221 The
costs of necessary borrowing should be deductible while the costs of dis-
cretionary borrowing should not.
Marrying deductibility to use effectuates good tax policy because it
ensures that only the costs of necessary borrowing will be deductible. A
system that marries deductibility to use treats the costs of obtaining
funds with which to engage in an activity as part of the cost of engaging
in the activity. Under such a system, interest would be deductible when
the purchase or activity which it facilitates is deductible. Embracing
such a system requires a rejection of the view that interest is inherently a
cost of doing business and therefore ought to be "universally"
deductible.222
A universal interest deduction makes sense only if the borrowing
transaction is independent of the use of the borrowed funds. 223 Econom-
"Consumption" is broadly applied, and in essence covers all expenditures except those
incurred as a cost in the earning or production of income and hence are proper offsets to
gross income to arrive at taxable net income.
Stanley S. Surrey, The Concept of Tax Reliefs-Its Relation to Tax Policy and Budget Policy, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTrTUTE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, SUBSIDIES, TAX RELIEFS AND PRICES (Varna
Congress, 1977), reprinted in Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept
Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 229 n.9 (1979).
Thus, a normative income tax excludes necessary expenditures from the determination of the
amount subject to taxation by not treating them as consumption to be added to the base. The Code
accomplishes that result by allowing the deduction of necessary expenditures in arriving at taxable
income. It then deviates from the normative structure by also providing deductions for amounts
that represent tax expenditures. See Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Heilmuth, The Tax Expenditure
Budget - Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528, 529 (1969).
221. The terms discretionary and necessary are used here in the sense that they are used in a
normative income tax system, so that the borrowing will be treated as discretionary when it is not a
cost of producing income and necessary when it is.
222. I have taken the term from MacIntyre, supra note 116, at 774; see also Johnson, supra note
116. A universal interest deduction can be supported on several grounds. A universal interest de-
duction can be seen as a way of giving "persons without capital the same privilege that persons with
capital can enjoy by liquidating taxed investments in order to shift into tax-favored investments." Id.
at 124. A universal interest deduction can also be seen as the "corollary of the taxation of the lender
on the interest received." Id. Some commentators even maintain that a universal interest deduction
is appropriate because any other system requires tracing and tracing is unadministrable. Id. at 125.
223. Characterizing the borrowing transaction without reference to the use of the borrowed
funds might follow from the treatment of borrowing in general. Borrowed funds are not income.
The classic reason given for that is that the borrower has an obligation to repay. Because the repay-
ment must proceed from after tax dollars, the treatment of the loan as income would result in double
taxation, unless a deduction were allowed. For federal income tax purposes, then, borrowed funds
are treated as if they were the taxpayer's own. It follows from this that the deductibility of the cost
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ically, it is not - taxpayers do not borrow just for the sake of borrow-
ing.224 They borrow for a reason and they generally use the borrowed
funds for a particular purpose. A tax system that fails to treat the cost of
borrowing to acquire something as part of the cost of acquiring the item
in question breeds inequity - it favors those who can and do borrow
over those who either cannot or do not.225
A fair tax system should treat interest like it treats any other cost of
acquiring an item or engaging in an activity.226 The biggest obstacle to
treating interest in that way is the difficulty of ascertaining the relation-
ship between the borrowing and the use of the borrowed funds. As Pro-
fessor Johnson acknowledged in 1986,227 and as many taxpayers and tax
professionals have discovered since the promulgation of Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.163-8T in 1987,228 determining the relationship between bor-
rowing and the use of the borrowed funds can be an administrative and
practical nightmare because it requires a determination of why the tax-
payer borrowed. That determination can be made either subjectively (by
asking the taxpayer) or objectively (by reference to the use to which the
taxpayer put the borrowed funds). A subjective test is not administrable
because it requires an examination of a taxpayer's state of mind, a diffi-
of borrowing could be treated independently of the use of the borrowed funds. In effect, treating the
use of the borrowed funds separately could be viewed as consistent with the tax treatment of those
funds as the borrower's own.
224. Some proponents of a universal interest deduction argue that such a deduction is necessary
to create parity between individuals with capital and those without. See MacIntyre, supra note 116.
But even that argument rests on the assumption that the taxpayer uses the borrowed funds to ac-
quire an income producing asset, and not for mere consumption.
225. The following example demonstrates the inequity. Taxpayers A and B each have $100 of
income and $500 of income producing assets during a given taxable period. Both taxpayers need to
spend $100 to acquire jewelry for personal consumption. Taxpayer A uses $100 of her wealth to do
so. Thus, at the end of the period she could still have $500 of wealth, although $100 of it will no
longer be income producing. She will also have taxable income of $100.
Taxpayer B borrows $100 and has to pay $10 in interest. The borrowing is a personal decision
because she could have chosen to use some of her wealth to acquire the jewelry. At the end of the
period, Taxpayer B still has $500 of wealth (the additional $100 liability offsets the new $100 asset)
and, if interest is deductible, only $90 of taxable income. Taxpayer B would therefore be in a better
tax position than Taxpayer A although that difference stems from their personal decisions to borrow
or not. Taxpayer B is also in a better long term position because she still has all of her income
producing assets which can continue to produce income even after she has paid off the $100 loan.
Giving Taxpayer B an interest deduction under those circumstances can be regressive and there-
fore unfair. It uses personal decisions to lower the tax burden only for those who have greater
wealth and therefore greater ability to borrow.
226. Professors Calvin Johnson and Michael MacIntyre have so urged. See Johnson, supra note
116, and MacIntyre, supra note 116.
227. Johnson, supra note 116, at 175-80.
228. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47. See Taggart, supra note 78.
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cult and time consuming task which is not certain to produce accurate
results. The objective test requires tracing the use of the borrowed funds.
Tracing hardly provides a perfect solution. Not only does the fungi-
bility of money make tracing difficult to do as a practical matter, 229 but
tracing can also be inaccurate. 230  Nevertheless, the difficulty encoun-
tered in establishing the relationship between the borrowed funds and the
item or activity they facilitate does not render tracing either futile or
inappropriate.231 It simply suggests that in most cases the link between
the use of borrowed funds and the deductibility of the interest thereon
should be established in general, rather than in specific, terms.
B. When to Marry: The Application of Tracing
If the desire to trace the use of borrowed funds proceeds from the
229. See, eg., supra note 225.
230. A taxpayer's use of borrowed funds for the apparent purpose of buying a house does not
necessarily mean that the borrowed funds made that purchase possible. The borrowed funds may
have only made it possible for the taxpayer to buy the house and retain her portfolio of securities, for
example.
The jurisprudence of§ 265 illustrates this problem. See Dillon, Read & Co., v. United States, 875
F.2d 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 413 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 396
U.S. 1007 (1970); Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968);
Bishop v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1965); Wynn v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 797
(E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 411 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970);
Barenholtz v. United States, 784 F.2d 375 (Fed Cir. 1986); Investors Diversified Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 575 F.2d 843 (Ct. CI. 1978); New Mexico Bancorporation v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1342 (1980); E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See Charles
E. Falk & Donna Balon, Wisconsin Cheeseman Revisited, 65 TAXES 711 (1987). (1 am indebted to
Amy A. Welsh and Kendall S. Zylstra, Temple University School of Law, Class of 1991, for educat-
ing me on the jurisprudence of § 265 while I was coaching them in a moot court competition involv-
ing that provision. The preceding research reflects their work.)
Professor Gunn uses a variation on this argument to defend the interest deduction as a proper
part of a normative tax system. Gunn, supra note 116. Professor Gunn argues that a taxpayer who
borrows to buy business assets and uses her own funds for personal consumption is in the same
position as one who borrows for personal consumption and uses her own funds to buy business
assets. Id. at 47. The only difference between those two taxpayers is their motive for borrowing and
Professor Gunn concludes that such a motive "is not only hard to find, it is not even worth looking
for." Id. Both taxpayers ought to be taxed in the same way and if an interest deduction is appropri-
ate in the case of the first, it ought similarly to be appropriate in the case of the second.
231. Tracing the use of borrowed funds and making deductibility of the interest contingent on
the use of the funds for a deductible purpose is both useful and appropriate because borrowing is not
aimless. By making the use of the funds determinative, Congress would be acknowledging that the
act of borrowing is discretionary. To say that interest ought to be deductible because borrowing is
the only way that certain segments of the population can acquire the wherewithal to be on an equal
footing with others, as Professor Gunn does, is to give those who are willing to borrow an advantage
over those who prefer to save and delay gratification. Gunn, supra note 116, at 48. Unless Congress
is prepared to say that saving is bad, Congress ought not give preferential treatment to those who
forego saving.
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desire to distinguish between discretionary borrowing and necessary bor-
rowing, then tracing should occur whenever taxpayers may properly en-
gage in both types of borrowing. 232 Two principles should guide the
process of establishing the link between deductibility and use. First, the
link should be established on the basis of a general rule which reflects the
likely behavior of the majority of taxpayers. Second, the link should be
established on the basis of the specific use of the proceeds only when the
relationship between the borrowed funds and their use is too strong to
ignore, as in the case of purchase money indebtedness.
Individuals present the clearest case for tracing because individuals
engage in both discretionary and necessary spending. Discretionary
spending is most easily seen as consumption. Because individuals con-
sume and because the tax law distinguishes between expenses that indi-
viduals incur for consumption and those they incur for business or profit
seeking purposes233 it is less difficult to extend the discretionary/neces-
sary distinction to the treatment of interest.234
In contrast to individuals, corporations are not generally regarded
as consumers. It has been easy to assume that because corporations do
not consume, all disbursements made by a corporation are caused by a
desire to pursue business objectives. Such a view leads to the conclusion
that even if tracing is appropriate in the case of individuals, where it is
important to distinguish between consumer and nonconsumer borrow-
ing,235 it is neither necessary nor appropriate in the case of corporations.
This conclusion does not withstand scrutiny. Not all corporate dis-
bursements are deductible. Even interest was not always deductible.2 36
Deductibility reflects a judgment about the proper role of a disbursement
in the computation of the tax base. If the cost of engaging in a particular
transaction has been judged nondeductible, there is little reason to judge
232. See supra text accompanying note 218.
233. Compare I.R.C. § 262 with I.R.C. § 162 and § 212.
234. It is interesting to note that Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, the seminal work comparing
a model income and consumption tax, would have retained the universal deductibility of interest
under both models. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS
FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 59, 111-12 (2d ed. 1984). In the case of the cash flow consumption tax,
interest paid would be deductible on indebtedness obtained through a qualified account. On indebt-
edness not obtained through a qualified account, neither repayment of interest nor repayment of
principal would be deductible. Id. at 112.
235. This distinction is, of course, a rather recent one, having been largely absent from the tax
law until 1986. See I.R.C. §§ 163(h) and 469, discussed supra notes 216-17.
236. Professor Warren has pointed out that the allowance of an unlimited interest deduction
for corporations entered the law in 1918 as a temporary measure designed to ameliorate the effect of
the World War I excess profits tax. See Warren, supra note 116, at 1585-86; see also Asimow, supra
note 1.
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deductible the cost of borrowing to facilitate the transaction. A tax pol-
icy that consistently applied that judgment would present the fewest op-
portunities for manipulation and abuse. It would treat taxpayers fairly
because it would treat the cost of borrowing as part of the cost of the
activity that the borrowing facilitates in all cases. It would also require
that corporations distinguish between borrowing that facilitates deducti-
ble disbursements and borrowing that facilitates nondeductible
disbursements.
That distinction need not be made in the same way for individuals as
for corporations, however. Because corporations are organized for the
purpose of engaging in business and because the expenses of carrying on
that business are likely to be deductible under normative principles of
taxation, much corporate borrowing should properly be deductible. For
corporate taxpayers, then, tracing should be the exception rather than
the rule. Corporate interest should remain deductible except in those
instances where the corporation borrowed funds needed for an easily
identifiable nondeductible disbursement.
1. The General Rule. The general rule should proceed from the
likely use of the borrowed funds. If business borrowing should be de-
ductible because it is a cost of doing business and the costs of doing busi-
ness are deductible, then taxpayers who are likely to borrow primarily
for business reasons should be subject to a general rule of deductibility of
interest. Conversely, taxpayers who are most likely to borrow for discre-
tionary, and therefore nondeductible, purposes should be subject to a
general rule of nondeductibility of interest.
Current law draws precisely such a distinction. Corporations can
generally deduct interest expense but individuals cannot.237 Individuals
can deduct interest expense only when it is related either to the conduct
of a trade or business or to the pursuit of an activity engaged in for profit,
or when the interest expense is related to a nonbusiness activity which
Congress has chosen to facilitate, such as the purchase of a residence.
23 8
The general rule of nondeductibility of the interest expense incurred by
individuals is sound, just as the general rule of deductibility of corporate
interest expense is. These general rules follow the distinctions currently
made by the Code.
23 9
Departures from that general rule should occur only when it is evi-
237. See supra notes 78-79 accompanying text.
238. I.R.C. § 163(h).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 232-35.
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dent that the rationale for the general rule does not apply. Tracing the
use of the proceeds can allow individual taxpayers to establish that the
cost of borrowing was part of engaging in a deductible activity, and
therefore ought to be deductible as well. 2' But because most individual
activities are not related to the conduct of a trade or business or an activ-
ity engaged in for profit, most individual interest ought not be itself de-
ductible. Tracing should only serve to establish the contrary. Because
most corporate activities are related to the conduct of the corporate trade
or business and are therefore deductible, most corporate interest ought to
be deductible. Tracing should only serve to establish the contrary.
2. The Relevance of Purchase Money Indebtedness. A general rule
of deductibility for corporate interest expense is essentially a presump-
tion that borrowed funds are used for a business purpose. It makes trac-
ing conceptually unnecessary in precisely the cases where it would be
most difficult.2 41 The general rule would apply to the deductibility of
interest on funds obtained under a line of credit or a general purpose
unsecured loan.
Where the facts more directly rebut the presumption of use of the
proceeds for a deductible activity, however, tracing is both appropriate
and administratively simple. In effect, where there is easily traceable evi-
dence of the use of funds, the general rule of deductibility need not apply.
A special rule should then apply. Purchase money indebtedness presents
the clearest case for the application of such a special rule.242 While sin-
240. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T (1987).
241. Professor Johnson has urged that interest should be deductible only when it is a cost of
producing ordinary income, and that interest incurred to purchase depreciable property does not
produce ordinary income because Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) depreciation, com-
bined with the investment tax credit, can be the economical equivalent of a tax exemption. See
Johnson, supra note 116, at 138. The demise of ACRS and the investment tax credit brought about
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 make this argument much less persuasive today than it was when it
was argued by Professor Johnson. In addition, the use of depreciable property to generate income in
excess of depreciation calls into question the equivalence of depreciation to tax exemption for
income.
242. Section 265(a)(2) applies such a rule by denying a deduction for interest "on indebtedness
incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations the interest on which is wholly exempt from
the taxes imposed by this subtitle." One serious problem in the administration of this provision has
been the need to apply it in cases other than traditional purchase money debt. Thus, both the Ser-
vice and the courts have had to address the situation where, rather than borrowing money and then
using that money directly for the purchase of tax-exempt securities, the taxpayer uses the tax-exempt
securities as collateral for a loan. See supra note 230.
Many of the difficulties which the Service and the courts have encountered would be alleviated by
the existence of mechanical tracing rules such as those now contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
8T(c)(1) (1987). Those rules, though complex, provide more certainty than the facts and circum-
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gling out purchase money indebtedness creates the potential for unfair-
ness and abuse, purchase money indebtedness presents too clear a case to
ignore.
243
Where tracing is difficult, as in the case of lines of credit or general
unsecured borrowing, it is not unreasonable to make the working as-
sumption that the funds were used for a deductible purpose. Doing so
has many of the advantages of adopting a universal interest deduction
and is sound for all of the reasons which would make the adoption of
such a deduction sound. Where the borrowed funds are represented by
purchase money indebtedness, however, the assumption of deductibility
is rebutted. The use of the borrowed funds is apparent and linking de-
ductibility to that use is both fair and administrable. In short, marrying
deductibility to use in the case of purchase money debt makes sense for
the same reasons as does the "origin of the claim" test in the case of
damages: it traces in those cases where tracing is easily accomplished. 2'
It is reasonable to adopt a regime that balances the conceptual pu-
rity of tracing with the administrative difficulty of doing so by tracing
only when the trace is clear.2 45 Under such a regime, a taxpayer who
does not need to borrow to engage in the nondeductible activity will not
do so.2' Only those who need to borrow to engage in the activity will
Proc. 74-8, 1974-1 C.B. 419, modified by Rev. Proc. 87-53, 1987-2 C.B. 669; Rev. Rul. 81-200, 1981-
2 C.B. 81. The complexity of the rules ought not to prevent their application to corporate interest
expense. The rules already apply to individual taxpayers, who, as a group, are far less able to under-
stand them. While the complexity of the rules might be a rationale for their repeal, it does not
support their application to individuals only. For an analysis of various methods of effecting an
allocation of interest, see Block, supra note 211, at 728-42. See also Blake D. Rubin, Pro-Rata
Interest Allocation: The Path Not Chosen, 36 TAx NoTES 301 (1987).
243. Professor MacIntyre has shown that most U.S. debt is purchase money or other clearly
traceable debt, so it is not terribly unfair to single out that kind of debt for special treatment. See
MacIntyre, supra note 116, at 785 n.56.
244. Professor Block has proposed a variation on this notion. See Block, supra note 211, at 710.
To take account of the failure of the current tax system to tax unrealized appreciation or to include
unrealized gains in earnings and profits, she suggests, at a minimum, that "any borrowing against
appreciated property will generate earnings and profits for the corporations to the extent of the
previously unrealized appreciation," and notes that I.R.C. § 312(i) already provides for such a result
in certain cases. Id.
245. In essence, this is what Congress has already done with the enactment of § 265. As dis-
cussed in notes 230-31 and accompanying text, supra, the difficulties in the administration of § 265
are not insurmountable, nor do they suggest that the provision is conceptually flawed. They suggest
only that a more mechanical application is desirable notwithstanding that it may produce less equita-
ble results in particular cases.
246. Because this rule would apply only in a the case of a C corporation (deficiency interest
incurred by individuals is already nondeductible, see supra note 78), there is little concern over
creating a potential trap for the ill-advised. Most C corporations have professionals prepare their
returns. The issue of deficiency interest will not arise unless there is either a late payment or an
435
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borrow. Where borrowing occurs, then, the link between the funds and
their use will be clear. The administrative problem of tracing will disap-
pear and the conceptual reason for tracing will become compelling. Un-
less one embraces the universal interest deduction, if other costs of
engaging in an activity are not deductible the cost of borrowing the
money which makes the activity possible should not be deductible either.
The Code already contains at least one corporate provision that
takes an approach very similar to that proposed here. Section 246A
reduces the dividends received deduction in the case of debt financed
portfolio stock.24 This provision requires tracing, but only where the
relationship between the debt and the acquisition is direct.248 Like the
model proposed here, section 246A requires tracing only when the rela-
tionship between the amount borrowed and the use of the proceeds is
fairly clear.
As with the discussion of the inequity which could result from the
nondeductibility of deficiency interest if all other interest remained de-
ductible,249 the proposed model is subject to the criticism that it will cre-
ate an artificial distinction between those who can borrow indirectly,
through the issuance of commercial paper or by obtaining general pur-
pose lines of credit, and those who must obtain purchase money debt.
250
Nevertheless, this distinction would level the playing field with respect to
returns. The issue of deficiency interest will not arise unless there is either a late payment or an
assessed deficiency. In both of those situations, it is likely that the taxpayer in question will obtain
professional advice.
247. Although § 246A reduces the dividends received deduction rather than the interest deduc-
tion and is therefore not precisely analogous, the notable feature of that provision is that the reduc-
tion occurs only when there is a direct relationship between the borrowing and the purchase of the
stock.
248. Section 246A(d)(3) defines the term 'portfolio indebtedness' as "any indebtedness directly
attributable to investment in the portfolio stock." (emphasis added). The Service has required a
"direct relationship," such as that exhibited where the lender makes a nonrecourse note secured by
portfolio stock, between the debt and an investment in stock. Rev. Rul. 88-66, 1988-2 C.B. 34; Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 91-41-006 (June 17, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-06-010 (Nov. 7, 1988).
The regulations that prescribe rules for the allocation and apportionment of interest expense for
purposes of determining the amount of foreign and domestic source taxable income of a taxpayer
also follow a pattern similar to that proposed here. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1), 864(e)(2); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.861-8(e) (1991). Thus, interest expense is generally allocated according to the taxpayer's assets,
except to the extent that the interest expense is attributable to nonrecourse debt that is clearly identi-
fied with specific assets. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2) (1991), Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(a)
(1991). In that case, interest expense is allocated to the income generated by that asset. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-10T(b) (1991). See generally JOSEPH ISENBERG, 1 INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
214-15 (1990); BORIS I. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 70-35 to 70-48 (1991).
249. See discussion supra Part III.
250. Id.
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borrowing generally. It would not single out a particular endeavor (the
payment of taxes) for different treatment. Congress has moved the law in
this direction,"' as has the Supreme Court. In Indopco, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,2"2 the Court narrowed the scope of deductible corporate expenses
by closely examining the nature of the benefit that a particular expense
generated.253 The reasoning employed by the Court in Indopco suggests
keener scrutiny of the benefits generated by particular disbursements,
and points the way toward increased restrictions on deductibility of items
heretofore regarded as normal costs of doing business. 254 As proposed in
this Article, where the relationship between the expenditure and the ac-
tivity that the expenditure facilitated was clear, it was not ignored and
was used as the basis for determining deductibility.
The adoption of tracing in the corporate context coupled with rec-
ognition of the distinction between interest and damages would require a
shift in general policy - the exception and the general rule would switch
places. In effect, the tax law would be saying that only amounts paid as a
result of consensual lending transactions would be deductible at all, and
that even such amounts would be subject to restrictions on deductibility
depending on the use to which they were put. Adoption of tracing would
necessarily limit the availability of the interest deduction, which would
have a profound effect on corporate taxpayers (as well as the federal gov-
ernment). Ultimately, deciding whether enacting such a limit is good
policy depends on further development of the benefits and costs of trac-
ing, and a view of what is best for the economy.
255
251. Provisions like § 263A, the uniform capitalization rules, represent an attempt to tie deduct-
ibility to use because the relationship between the funds and the use to which they are put is too
obvious for the tax system to ignore. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 78, at 509-13. Provi-
sions like § 163(h), which limits an individual's ability to deduct personal interest, also tie deductibil-
ity to use. Similarly, § 246A limits the deductibility of dividends received but does so by reference to
the origin of the process used to purchase the stock.
252. 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1374 (Feb. 26, 1992).
253. The Court made the deductibility of amounts paid for professional fees dependent on the
purpose for which the professional fees were incurred. Because the fees facilitated a capital expendi-
ture, the Court denied deductibility, despite the fact that the fees did not give rise to a specific,
separately identifiable asset. Id. at *16.
254. See Paul M. Barrett & Randall Smith, High Court Denies Tax Deductions for Takeover
Fees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1992, at BS.
255. The question whether the current treatment of interest is good for the economy has been
hotly and frequently debated. See, eg., Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt, Part I, Hearings
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1989); Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers
and Acquisitions, Part I, Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 101 Cong., Ist Sess.
10 (1989). See generally Robert Willens, The Corporate Provisions of the Revenue Reconciliations Act
of 1990, 22 TAX ADVISER 3 (1991); Seth M. Zachary & Jill Greenwald, Tax Considerations in




The law has tended to treat as interest any amount measured by an
interest rate, operating under the assumption that the nature of the mea-
surement determines the characterization of the amount. This Article
has challenged that traditional view. It has suggested that in many cases,
amounts which the law calls interest might more accurately be viewed as
damages for late payment.
Determining whether an amount is interest or damages is important
because the tax law treats interest and damages differently. Deficiency
interest provides a good vehicle for exploring the similarity between in-
terest and damages, and for analyzing the tax consequences of the char-
acterization of an amount as interest or damages. Three things become
clear.
First, the distinction between interest and damages was not always
as blurred as is today. An analysis of the cases that understood and ex-
pressed the distinction reveals that its blurring resulted from a following
of holdings without regard to rationales. The distinction is sound, it
comports with economic reality and would provide a powerful analytical
tool for courts and legislatures. Its lack of prominence in the current
legal landscape can easily be rectified by courts willing to engage in
thoughtful analysis.
Second, deficiency interest is probably more accurately viewed as
damages. Deficiency interest bears few of the indicia of commercial in-
terest, and sound tax policy is not served by treating it in the same way as
commercial interest. If deficiency interest is damages it should not be
deductible, regardless of the identity of the payor.
Third, acceptance of the proposition that deficiency interest should
be treated as damages suggests a re-examination of the nearly universal
deductibility of corporate interest expense under current law. That re-
examination leads to a conclusion that in general, the deductibility of
interest, like that of damages, ought to depend on the ultimate use of the
proceeds. In the case of corporations, a model which presumes deduct-
ibility but traces in the case of purchase money indebtedness provides a
good compromise between accuracy and administrability.
Acceptance of both the suggested distinction between interest and
damages and the suggested limitation of interest expense on purchase
(1991 Part 1); Sherry R. Sontag, Takeovers Get Even Costlier, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 3;
Richard D. Belford & Kenneth G. Greenberg, Employee Benefits, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 16.
Further analysis of it is beyond the scope of the piece.
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money indebtedness would undoubtedly narrow the scope of the interest
deduction. To do so would be consistent with the trend of recent legisla-
tion.2" 6 For those who believe the trend should continue, the suggestions
made here will provide one more item of ammunition.
256. Recent legislation has persistently narrowed the scope of the interest deduction, both for
individuals and for corporations. See supra notes 79, 216-219. Not only has § 163 grown from five
subsections in 1975 (see I.R.C. § 163 (1975)) to eleven subsections in 1991 (see I.R.C. § 163 (1991)),
but other provisions have specifically limited the deductibility of interest expense. See, eg., I.R.C.
§§ 263(A), 279, 461(h), 469. Certain provisions limit tax benefits otherwise available when the prop-
erty is financed with debt. See, eg., I.R.C. § 246(A) (reducing the dividends received deduction
available with respect to debt-financed portfolio stock). Bifurcation of debt instruments required by
§ 163(e)(5) and permitted by the last clause of§ 385 promises to make denial of payments previously
classified as interest more common. Indeed, bifurcation is becoming a powerful analytical tool. See
Steven J. Willis, The Options Aspect of Nonrecourse Loans, 54 TAx NoTEs 441 (1992); Yishai Beer,
Nonrecourse Loans: Do Not Forget to Tax the Option, 53 TAx NoTES 837 (1991); Robert Feldgarden
et al., Bifurcating Nonrecourse Debt, 51 TAx NoTEs 1462 (1991); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275(4)(g),
51 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (bifurcating contingent debt instruments); Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Stance in
Staley Underscores Roaring Issues Raised by LYONS, 53 TAx NoTEs 1453, 1455 (1991).

